1 2 3 IPPERWASH PUBLIC INQUIRY 4 5 6 7 ******************** 8 9 10 BEFORE: THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE SIDNEY LINDEN, 11 COMMISSIONER 12 13 14 15 16 Held at: Forest Community Centre 17 Kimball Hall 18 Forest, Ontario 19 20 21 ******************** 22 23 24 May 16th, 2005 25

2
  1                        Appearances
  2  Derry Millar      )             Commission Counsel
  3  Susan Vella        )
  4  Donald Worme, Q. C )    (np)
  5  Katherine Hensel  )    (np)
  6  Jodi-Lynn Waddilove )   (np)
  7  
  8  Murray Klippenstein )  (np)      The Estate of Dudley 
  9  Vilko Zbogar       )   (np)     George and George
 10  Andrew Orkin       )            Family Group
 11  Basil Alexander    )            Student-at-Law
 12  
 13  Peter Rosenthal  )   (np)       Aazhoodena and George
 14  Jackie Esmonde   )              Family Group
 15  
 16  Anthony Ross     )              Residents of 
 17  Kevin Scullion   )              Aazhoodena  (Army Camp)
 18  William Henderson )              Kettle Point & Stony
 19  Jonathon George  )   (np)       Point First Nation
 20  Colleen Johnson  )   (np)
 21  
 22  Kim Twohig       )              Government of Ontario
 23  Walter Myrka     )   (np)
 24  Susan Freeborn   )   (np)
 25  Michelle Pong    )   (np)

3
  1                   APPEARANCES (cont'd)
  2  Janet Clermont   )              Municipality of 
  3  David Nash       )   (np)       Lambton Shores
  4  
  5  Peter Downard    )              The Honourable Michael
  6  Bill Hourigan    )              Harris
  7  Jennifer McAleer )
  8  
  9  Ian Smith        )              Robert Runciman
 10  Alice Mrozek     )
 11  Harvey Stosberg  )   (np)       Charles Harnick
 12  Jacqueline Horvat )
 13  Douglas Sulman, Q.C. )           Marcel Beaubien
 14  Trevor Hinnegan     ) 
 15  
 16  Mark Sandler       )            Ontario Provincial 
 17  Andrea Tuck-Jackson )            Ontario Provincial Police
 18  Leslie Kaufman     )  (np)
 19  
 20  Ian Roland       )   (np)       Ontario Provincial 
 21  Karen Jones      )   (np)       Police Association &
 22  Debra Newell     )              K. Deane
 23  Ian McGilp       )   (np)
 24  Annie Leeks      )   (np)
 25  Jennifer Gleitman )

4
  1                   APPEARANCES (cont'd)
  2  
  3  Julian Falconer  )              Aboriginal Legal 
  4  Brian Eyolfson   )              Services of Toronto
  5  Julian Roy       )   (np)
  6  Clem Nabigon     )   (np)
  7  Adriel Weaver     )   (np)       Student-at-Law
  8  
  9  Al J.C. O'Marra  )              Office of the Chief
 10  Robert Ash, Q.C. )    (np)       Coroner
 11  
 12  William Horton   )              Chiefs of Ontario
 13  Matthew Horner   )
 14  Kathleen Lickers )   (Np)
 15  
 16  Mark Frederick   )   (np)       Christopher Hodgson
 17  Craig Mills      )   (np)
 18  Megan Mackey     )   (np)
 19  Erin Tully       )
 20  
 21  David Roebuck    )   (Np)       Debbie Hutton
 22  Anna Perschy     )   (np)
 23  Melissa Panjer   )
 24  Danya Cohen-Nehemia ) (np)
 25

1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 Page 3 Exhibits 6 4 5 JOHN FREDERICK CARSON, Resumed 6 Continued Examination-In-Chief by Mr. Derry Millar 8 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Certificate of Transcript 257 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

1 EXHIBITS 2 No. Description Page 3 P-422 Document Number 1002409. Map of 4 Ipperwash Military Reserve and 5 Ipperwash Provincial Park marked 6 by Witness, Mr. John Carson. 36 7 P-423(A) CU-034. Photograph and description 8 of green operational uniform worn by 9 OPP officers assigned to K9, ERT and 10 TRU departments. 93 11 P-423(B) CU-035. Photograph and description 12 of green operational uniform with ERT 13 duty cap worn by officers assigned 14 to ERT. 93 15 P-423(C) CU-038. Photograph and description of 16 grey operational uniform worn by OPP 17 officers assigned to K9, ERT and TRU 18 details; with the exception that only 19 ERT may wear the ERT duty cap. 93 20 P-424 Project Maple notes, September 1995. 107 21 P-425 Document Number 1004483. Register 22 containing names of persons receiving 23 copies of Project Maple operational 24 plan Sept 04/95 to Sept 10/95. 143 25

1 EXHIBITS (cont'd) 2 No. Description Page 3 P-426 Document Number 1002419. Scribe 4 notes (OPP) from Sept 04/95 to 5 Sept 09/95. Typed pages 1 to 158. 163 6 P-427 Document Number 1000152 OPP 7 Handwritten scribe notes, 8 pages 370 TO 587. 164 9 P-428 Master Disc of Chief Superintendent 10 J. Carson Audio Logger selected tracks, 11 Mobile Unit, Sept '05 to 07/95. 255 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

1 --- Upon commencing at 10:30 a.m. 2 3 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 4 now in session. The Honourable Mr. Justice Linden 5 presiding. Please be seated. 6 7 (BRIEF PAUSE) 8 9 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Good morning, 10 Commissioner. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 12 morning, everybody. 13 14 JOHN FREDERICK CARSON, Resumed: 15 16 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Good Morning, Deputy 17 Carson. 18 THE WITNESS: Good morning. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 20 morning. 21 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir. 22 23 CONTINUED EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 24 Q: If I could take you back to Exhibit 25 410, which is the minutes of 1995/1996; they should be --

1 it's a Cerlox bound document there. 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 And at Tab 4, page 49. 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: The -- one (1) of the things -- and 8 I'm going to refer to the note at the top of the page, 9 August the 29th, 1995 and we spoke briefly about this the 10 last day. 11 One (1) of the things that you said that 12 you developed on August the 29th, was an org. chart and I 13 take it by that you mean an organizational chart? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: And was that the organizational chart 16 that ultimately got -- was incorporated into Project 17 Maple? 18 A: That's correct. 19 Q: And when that organization chart was 20 first drafted, the -- did it have in it a section for 21 intelligence, do you recall, on August the 29th? 22 A: I couldn't tell you for sure. Some 23 of it was drawn out on a white board on the wall. That 24 would have been part of the criminal -- criminal side of 25 the investigation.

1 Q: Can you just tell us a little bit 2 more about the meeting on August the 29th; you spoke 3 briefly about it on Thursday? 4 How did you -- what kind of things 5 happened on August the 29th? 6 A: The meeting on the 29th involved a 7 small group of people. Staff Sergeant -- Detective Staff 8 Sergeant Mark Wright who represented the criminal 9 investigations part of this incident, Sergeant Grant from 10 our training unit who would be representing the 11 logistics, Constable, or actually it was Acting Sergeant 12 Ken Dean at the time representing the tactical -- tactics 13 and rescue unit and Sergeant Korosec who would represent 14 the emergency response team personnel. 15 With -- with that small group we discussed 16 a number of alternatives as a result of the discussions 17 we had the day before with Chief Coles and Superintendent 18 Parkin. And what we did was started brain storming 19 various scenarios of a potential takeover of Ipperwash 20 Provincial Park which we anticipated would be after 21 Labour Day. 22 And we had some discussion around the role 23 of the various units that would be involved but it was 24 ERT, TRU, negotiators, the criminal investigations and 25 started developing a flow chart of -- of who would be

1 assigned -- responsible for assignments to what task. 2 Q: And what was the basis of the plan 3 that -- that you were discussing on August the 29th? 4 A: The plan was always based on -- well, 5 actually, there was a couple of theories if you would. 6 First of all, not knowing exactly how the 7 events might unfold, one of the scenarios was that people 8 might come into the Park, attempt to occupy it and that 9 we would keep officers in the Park with those occupiers 10 while Ministry of Natural Resources would literally work 11 towards achieving or applying and securing an injunction. 12 The other scenario, the very, you know, 13 first scenario, is, you know, one (1) or two (2) people 14 come in, and are trespassing, refuse to leave and are 15 treated as routine trespassers. 16 And the last scenario being one of people 17 come in, occupy the park and for a variety of reasons, 18 whether its violence or -- or other issues, that police 19 must withdraw from the Park, secure the -- the area and 20 proceed to have Ministry of Natural Resources seek an 21 injunction and us control the outer perimeter of the 22 Park. 23 Q: So the three (3) basis working 24 premises were: 25 1. People would come in, officers would

1 stay. In effect you would co-habitat with the occupiers? 2 A: That's correct. 3 Q: the second was if one (1) or two (2) 4 people came in, they would be treated as trespassers, 5 arrested and removed? 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: And the third was if too -- if there 8 were a large number of people and for whatever reason it 9 was determined the officers should not remain, the 10 officers would leave? 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: And except for the one (1) or two (2) 13 individuals coming into the park and refusing to leave 14 and being treated as trespasser, with the other two (2) 15 scenarios, what was the intention of the OPP with respect 16 to an injunction? 17 A: It was always the position of the 18 Provincial Police that the Ministry of Natural Resources 19 would be required to proceed with an injunction 20 application. 21 Q: And with respect to the plan that was 22 under -- under contemplation on August the 29th, was 23 there any contemplation about simply guarding the 24 perimeter of the Park to prevent -- prevent people coming 25 in on -- when the Park was closing on September the 4th?

1 A: That scenario was discussed but was 2 dismissed as not -- not a viable option. 3 Q: And why wasn't it a viable option? 4 A: Well, it comes down to simple 5 logistics that while we would -- we could patrol it and 6 maintain a -- an officer presence, that probably would -- 7 would deter an entry into the Park or an attempt to 8 occupy the Park, at some point in time, we have to 9 withdraw the resources. 10 I mean, once the Park is closed, we have a 11 hundred and nine (109) acres of property that is 12 literally pine trees, and at what point in time do we 13 determine it's no longer necessary to protect a hundred 14 and nine (109) acres of pine trees. 15 Q: And so that was part of your 16 thinking, that the Park, once it was closed, to maintain 17 officers there to prevent people coming in would be 18 having many officers, as you put it, guarding pine trees 19 in a -- in a closed Park? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: Now, we spoke briefly about the 22 towers yesterday and -- I mean on Thursday and we then 23 got down to your notes of September 1st and the minutes 24 that were marked Exhibit 421. And those minutes, Deputy, 25 there may be a copy right in front of you --

1 A: Yes, there is. 2 Q: -- but they're also in -- it's 3 Inquiry document 3000574. And the people who attended 4 this meeting were yourself, Acting -- Acting Detective 5 Sergeant -- Staff Sergeant Wright, Sergeant Brad Seltzer; 6 and Brad Seltzer was in charge of negotiations? 7 A: That was his role there, yes. 8 Q: And, Constable Ken Deane? And, what 9 was Mr. Deane's role? 10 A: He was representing the Tactics and 11 Response Unit. 12 Q: And, Constable Stankevich -- S-T-A-N- 13 K-E-V-I-C-H? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: And, what was his role? 16 A: He and the next member, Constable 17 Japp, were representing Logistics. 18 Q: And, Logistics contemplated what? 19 A: Well, all the -- we were -- we were 20 going to require a number of people; some of these tasks 21 actually are -- are duplicated by a number of people, so 22 it was actually almost like project teams here -- 23 Q: Yes? 24 A: -- so, a number of people are 25 brought in to work on the same task. So, each -- what

1 happens here is each team is tasked with developing a 2 plan for their area of responsibility. 3 Q: Okay. 4 A: So, for instance, Japp, Dennis and 5 Stankevich, Seltzer -- well, not Seltzer, but those folks 6 and Sergeant Grant are all working on logistics. 7 Q: So, Staff Sergeant Dennis was also 8 logistics? 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: Sergeant -- it's Doug Babbitt -- B-A- 11 B-B-I-T-T? 12 A: Yes, sir. 13 Q: He was the media relations person? 14 A: Yes, he was the media coordinator for 15 the Western Region at that time. 16 Q: Staff Sergeant Bouwman? 17 A: He's the Detachment Commander at 18 Forest. 19 Q: Constable Speck? 20 A: He is one (1) of the Detective 21 Constables be involved in the criminal investigations 22 side. 23 Q: And, he was based in Forest? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And, had been based in Forest for a

1 long time? 2 A: Yes, most -- the majority of his 3 thirty-odd year career had been spent in this area for 4 the most part. 5 Q: Sergeant Huntley 6 A: Sergeant Huntley was one (1) of the 7 ERT leaders. 8 Q: Detective Sergeant Parent? 9 A: He was one (2) of the criminal 10 investigators. 11 Q: Sergeant Grant? 12 A: Again, he's one (1) of our training 13 Members, but he was assigned to logistics. 14 Q: So, he was there not as a trainer, 15 but as a logistics person? 16 A: Logistics, correct. 17 Q: Sergeant Bell? 18 A: He represents Intelligence. 19 Q: Sergeant McLean? 20 A: He is another ERT leader from the 21 Cayuga area. 22 Q: District Technologist K. Robson? 23 A: He's representing the Communications 24 side of the business. He is a civilian technical person 25 who provides technical support to radio as in two (2) way

1 radio and telephone systems. 2 Q: Sergeant Cousineau? 3 A: He's a supervisor from the Chatham 4 Com. Centre involved in the communications. 5 Q: And, Sergeant Korosec? 6 A: Korosec is one (1) of the ERT leaders 7 from the Lambton County area. 8 Q: Sergeant Vandamme, V-A-N-D-A-M-M-E? 9 A: Yes, he is another ERT leader from 10 the Woodstock area. 11 Q: So, the four (4) ERT leaders of the 12 ERT teams were there? 13 A: Correct. 14 Q: Clerk Typist Janet Vandenberg 15 (phonetic) was a civilian member of the force? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: And, she is a typist as it's noted 18 here? 19 A: Yes, she -- she's an admin member of 20 our staff from the Forest Detachment. 21 Q: And, was she one -- did she become 22 one (1) of the scribes? 23 A: No. 24 Q: Okay. Inspector Hutchinson? 25 A: Yes, he was from the -- well then,

1 headquarters in downtown London with Coles; he was the -- 2 looking after criminal operations. 3 Q: And, I note at this meeting there was 4 no one from the Ministry of Natural Resources at this 5 meeting -- 6 A: No, sir. 7 Q: -- is that correct? 8 A: That's absolutely right. 9 Q: And, why is that, Deputy Carson? 10 A: This was specifically a planning 11 meeting for OPP resources. 12 Q: In terms of what the OPP would do 13 with respect to various scenarios that the OPP 14 contemplate? 15 A: Correct. This was -- this was to 16 brainstorm all the options and come up with a -- a plan 17 that would address any eventuality. 18 Q: And, this meeting lasted how long, 19 sir? 20 A: What happened was, in the morning -- 21 we began at 9:00 in the morning, I outlined the various 22 scenarios that we had discussed on the Tuesday with the - 23 - the small group and assigned or had discussion with 24 each area of responsibility to come up with some plans or 25 options given their area of expertise.

1 This went on for a couple of hours which 2 is basically the -- the minutes as you see them. Each 3 area went away whether it was TRU, ERT, Communications, 4 whatever, media relations, and they were tasked with 5 coming back in the afternoon with a draft of what their 6 contribution to the plan would be. 7 Q: Okay. And perhaps we'll just -- I'll 8 ask you a few questions about the minutes, Exhibit 421. 9 The objective is noted to have contained and negotiate a 10 peaceful solution and who created that objective for 11 Project Maple? 12 A: I did. 13 Q: And why did you choose that as the 14 objective? 15 A: My experience in incident command and 16 as previously as a crisis negotiator and the various 17 training courses and scenarios I've worked on, I -- I 18 recognize it's very important that the people involved 19 understand clearly what the objective of their assignment 20 is. 21 And in my view, there was a number of 22 scenarios that were going to potentially play out and it 23 was important that every member involved understand what 24 the objective was, so as they carried out their role, 25 that they supported the objective as a team.

1 Q: And did the team that was assembled 2 on September 1st, was there a discussion about that 3 objective? 4 A: I certainly laid it out and ensured 5 that everyone understood it. My approach to these things 6 is that if someone has a comment or a concern or a 7 viewpoint that is different than my own, particularly at 8 the planing stage anyway, that I expect that they would 9 voice those opinions and come to some understanding. 10 Now, in this group the likes of Sergeant 11 Seltzer have been negotiators in their career as well and 12 I would suggest that this is typical of the expectation 13 we would have of our people move forward on any 14 barricaded or armed type situation that we would normally 15 encounter. 16 Q: In effect as police officers, the -- 17 if you have an incident whether it's this incident or any 18 other incident, the idea is to contain it and arrive at a 19 peaceful solution to the problem? 20 A: Correct. And that -- that has been 21 my experience as a crisis negotiator and incident 22 commander for -- for many years. And that -- that is the 23 -- obviously the preferred approach. 24 Q: And is that something that's a policy 25 in -- or back in 1995 was a policy of the OPP? Was it

1 written down somewhere or -- 2 A: I -- I would suggest that's a part of 3 the training in the course training standards of crisis 4 negotiators, ERT training, tactical training, all the 5 level of emergency response training. 6 Q: Then there's a note in the next 7 paragraph, "preliminary planning has been done"; and does 8 that simply -- what does that refer to? 9 A: Well it basically means that we have 10 done some work on the planning. I refer back to the 11 Monday and Tuesday meetings around the discussions and 12 some of the expectations that were being developed. 13 And as -- as that paragraph indicates, 14 things like the command trailer being brought to London. 15 I had already tasked some -- some assignments to be 16 undertaken prior to this meeting. 17 Q: And so Charlie is Charlie Bouwman -- 18 I take it in the first paragraph? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: And if there was an incident, the 21 Forest Detachment in affect was going to operate out of 22 the Grand Bend Detachment so that the Forest Detachment 23 could be used as the incident command post? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: Then the next paragraph is the

1 scenario that you've already spoken about. If the Park 2 is taken over, possibly approximately twenty (20) people 3 will enter the Park not willing to leave; how did you 4 come up with the number twenty (20)? 5 A: It was the best guess scenario at -- 6 at the very least. 7 Q: And this was a plan -- was this the 8 basic -- if the twenty (20) people would come in as you 9 outlined one (1) of the scenarios -- the MNR would then 10 ultimately get an injunction with respect to the land? 11 A: Correct, particularly if there was a 12 refusal to leave. I mean, the whole scenario was based 13 on the fact that they would be asked to leave peaceably, 14 and if they refused to leave, then we move to the next 15 step. 16 Q: Then at the bottom of the page: 17 "Try and manage the area to keep the 18 people out." 19 There's a discussion there about keeping 20 people out; can you tell us a little bit about that? 21 A: Yes, at once occupation occurs, that 22 -- what this is referring to is: try to manage the area 23 to prevent additional people to come in after the fact. 24 One of the issues there was security 25 around the fence line of the Park. The Park has a fence

1 all along Matheson Drive right to the -- well, close to 2 the -- to the beach area, and then there is Matheson 3 Drive, then there's another small ditch, I believe, and a 4 fence that runs the perimeter of Matheson Drive on the 5 far side of it, which is actually on military base 6 property. 7 So it was discussing the logistics or the 8 tactics that that would create. 9 Q: And I note: 10 "Some people may get through our 11 security lines no matter how hard we 12 try up to the ERT and TRU people. We 13 can secure the fence and the Park 14 itself but again, that is if it is a 15 fairly peaceful thing." 16 And what was discussed about this, and 17 what is that referring to? 18 A: Well, there was some recognition that 19 no matter how much effort we put in that, you know, other 20 people may attempt to join in, and despite our best 21 efforts, people can be pretty ingenious of how they -- 22 they achieve this and short of, you know, violent 23 confrontations, it may be next to impossible to prevent 24 some people from coming in. 25 Q: Okay. And then it goes on:

1 "Natives in the military base do have 2 weapons. There has never been any 3 situation where the OPP have been 4 challenged with a firearm. No 5 confrontation with any native during 6 the recent fatal MBA at Ipperwash. 7 The outsiders are a -- the concern. 8 Investigative teams ident. with video 9 running all the time to identify every 10 person that is in the area. 11 TRU video printer will be needed. 12 Forest Detachment Members can identify 13 these people in the event that their 14 identity is required for charges. 15 There is a potential for violence." 16 So that you were aware and discussed with 17 your team on the Friday that the occupiers of the army 18 camp had weapons? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: And they were hunters, you knew that, 21 you told us that last week? 22 A: Yes, and there was intelligence 23 information that they were well aware of in regards to 24 weaponry. 25 Q: And the -- but in terms of your

1 planning the OPP -- there had never been a incident since 2 1993 with -- between an occupier at the army camp, and an 3 OPP officer, that involved a firearm? 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: And that was part of what was being 6 discussed at this meeting? 7 A: Yes, I wanted to ensure there was a - 8 - the same level of understanding between the management 9 team that was going to be operating at this incident. 10 Q: And the -- but what you wanted to do, 11 as it's noted here, is to identify, assuming the Park was 12 taken over, everybody who went into, and out of the Park? 13 A: Yes, sir. 14 Q: And there's an item -- a line: 15 "The outsiders are the concern." 16 What was discussed about that and what was 17 the concern? 18 A: Well, it comes down to the issue that 19 the majority of occupiers who normally reside at Kettle 20 Point were people that knew many of our officers, and our 21 officers would know them. 22 And while there may be confrontations, or 23 some altercations is probably a better descriptor, I 24 really didn't believe that they would use firearms 25 against our officers; it certainly had not been our

1 experience. 2 However, some of the intelligence would 3 suggest that there was some other people with various 4 backgrounds, that we couldn't be so confident of, or 5 maybe there were some people in there that we would not 6 even be aware of, in the military base, that had 7 potential of maybe having different behaviours than what 8 we normally were accustomed to. 9 Q: So that with respect to the occupiers 10 who were from Kettle and Stoney Point, you knew those 11 people, you weren't concerned about them using weapons 12 against the officers? 13 A: I didn't believe they would. 14 Q: And the reference, "there is 15 potential for violence" refers to what? 16 A: Well it's a number of things. I mean 17 it's (a) with the behaviour of -- of the outsiders, that 18 could potentially escalate things and it was also in 19 relation to some of the activities that had already taken 20 place at the military base back at the end of July. 21 The issue with the bus and ramming of the 22 drill hall the military jeep and some of the behaviours 23 with vehicles that had occurred over the ongoing period 24 between the military and the occupiers, that we had to be 25 mindful that that behaviour could be brought to bear at

1 the Park as well. 2 Q: So, there was a -- the bus incident 3 on July 29th was a concern? 4 A: Very much so. 5 Q: And was something that you and your 6 team thought about on September the 2nd? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: September the 1st, excuse me? 9 A: Yes. Correct. 10 Q: And that was the violence that you 11 were concerned about as opposed to violence with 12 firearms? 13 A: Well we were concerned about both. 14 We had some discussion about how the TRU team would 15 deploy and -- and trying to contain the perimeter of the 16 Park. 17 There was some discussion that we would 18 deploy personnel on Matheson Drive. And I vetoed that 19 decision or that recommendation based on the fact that it 20 would be possible for people to be hiding within the 21 military base and have some of our officers in line of 22 fire between the fence lines on Matheson Drive. 23 And they could possibly come under fire 24 and not have any way for -- for us to rescue them out of 25 there. So we were brainstorming worst case scenarios.

1 Q: And that was -- in the next 2 paragraph: 3 "In the event shots are fired the area 4 will have to be secured. This area 5 could grow in no time, this is the 6 worst case scenario." 7 And when you say, "this area could grow in 8 no time", what is being referred to there? 9 A: Well what it means is is we would 10 have to secure the area -- if there was a shooting, we'd 11 have to secure the area for the subsequent investigation 12 that accompanies that kind of criminal event. 13 And so it might be necessary for us to 14 secure the area that actually is part of the Military 15 Base if there is shooting that occurs from the base in 16 towards the Park. 17 Q: And when you say, "this area could 18 grow in no time" the crime scene, assuming that you were 19 considering might have to be expanded? I'm not quite 20 understanding -- 21 A: Well if -- for instance, if to that 22 point -- if -- if there were shots fired from -- from the 23 Military Base, that we're not -- now we're not talking 24 about the hundred and nine (109) acres of -- of the Park, 25 we're talking about the Park and the area where the shots

1 were fired from. 2 But because it is then deemed to be a 3 crime scene, we have to secure all of the crime scene. 4 Even that area which occurred from within the military 5 base which wasn't our prime concern for securing at this 6 point, but it was something we had to be mindful of. 7 That was an eventuality we might face. 8 Q: "Concerns should be [it arised, but I 9 think it should be raised] now, not 10 after the fact in the event of an 11 inquest." 12 And what's that refer to, sir? 13 A: That basically goes back to my 14 earlier comments that if anyone in the room had any 15 suggestions or concerns that they felt needed to be 16 addressed, that I wanted them on the table then. 17 Q: So, your management style, if I might 18 put it, is to get input from people and listen to their 19 suggestions and if they're good suggestions, incorporate 20 them? 21 A: Often times they're better than my 22 ideas. 23 Q: And that's what you're referring to? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: "Then TRU High Dunes is -- are

1 is where the fires may come from. TRU 2 will be deployed immediately if this 3 thing happens but they will be deployed 4 at Pinery Provincial Park. They will 5 be in the backup role in the initial 6 stages. Hopefully it will be a very 7 peaceful demonstration. If a shooting 8 takes place, TRU will be very 9 operational." 10 And can you tell us what the discussion 11 that's being referred to there with respect to the tactic 12 -- tactical rescue unit? 13 A: Yes. All that is indicating is that 14 the TRU team will be moved from London and they will 15 placed on standby at the Pinery Provincial Park bunkhouse 16 so that they are readily available to us if there was a 17 need to deploy them. 18 And what this is referring to, is that if 19 we're going to -- if -- if we take fire from the Military 20 Base, there's a strong possibly because of the 21 topography, that it could come from the dunes because 22 it's just the geography of -- of that locale. 23 And if shooting does take place then we 24 will have to mobilize TRU and task them to provide 25 potential rescue or -- or other tasks related to their

1 role. 2 Q: And the dunes are the dunes that are 3 along the shoreline on the northern part of the Army Camp 4 that's being referred to? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Then you go -- the notes go on: 7 "It may be necessary to have two (2) 8 TRU teams. Assessment has to be done. 9 In the initial stages we have to get in 10 there and stay close by. The 11 visibility has to be there at the 12 onset." 13 And what's that referring to? Is that the 14 TRU teams or something else? 15 A: Well, there's a couple of things. 16 The necessity of two (2) TRU teams, is each TRU team 17 operates with twelve (12) members. So, it's a matter of 18 if you have to deploy them and maintain them for any 19 length of time, you have to look at backup and fatigue 20 issues. 21 So, it may be necessary to have a second 22 TRU team there, (a) for relieving one (1) team if it's 23 going to be longer term and, (b) depending on how large 24 the scenario is, it may be necessary to have more than 25 twelve (12) members operating on the ground.

1 So, it's a matter of trying to gauge the 2 events as -- as they potentially could develop, is what 3 that's about. 4 In "the initial stages", that's talking 5 about being present in the Park and trying to stay close 6 by and that goes back to the cohabitation scenario. 7 Q: And that would not be with the TRU 8 team, but with ERT members? 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: And "the visibility has to be there 11 at the onset", that refers to the cohabitation in the 12 Park? 13 A: Yes, the presence of uniformed 14 officers. 15 Q: And would they be uniform officers in 16 -- I -- perhaps I could -- as I've gone through this 17 material, there are officers who are called -- referred 18 to as 'blue shirts' and blue shirts -- can you tell us 19 what that refers to? 20 A: That's officers in standard patrol 21 gear 22 Q: And then the ERT team, when it's 23 deployed as an ERT team do they wear standard uniforms or 24 something else? 25 A: Normally they're deployed in grey ERT

1 uniforms. 2 Q: And then the TRU team has a different 3 colour uniform? 4 A: No, ERT and TRU have the same colour 5 uniforms. 6 Q: Yes. 7 A: Actually both -- both ERT and TRU 8 have access to grey -- urban grey is what they call them, 9 or -- or greens. And depending on the scenario and the 10 topography they're working within, the unit commanders 11 may make a decision to deploy them in the colour that's 12 appropriate for the terrain. 13 Q: So, that the -- the officers that 14 were going to be in the Park, the -- on the cohabitation 15 plan, was it contemplated they would be in blues or 16 greys? 17 A: Greys. 18 Q: Grey? And that's the reference to 19 the visibility has to be there at the onset, you would -- 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: -- put your -- in effect, put the ERT 22 teams into the Park along with the occupiers? 23 A: Correct. 24 Q: Then: 25 "Mark is John's assistant. He has the

1 knowledge of the history of this entire 2 investigation." 3 That's self-explanatory. Mark is 4 Detective Sergeant Mark Wright? 5 A: Correct. 6 Q: Then: 7 "Concern about the OPP personnel being 8 boxed in, in Provincial Park. John - 9 this has been looked at, this is being 10 addressed with the MNR as we speak." 11 Now, this is something you spoke about a 12 minute ago; how was the -- what else can you tell us 13 about this? 14 A: Well, it was also the access and 15 egress routes to the Park, itself. There's a gate in the 16 area of where the maintenance shack is located and 17 generally, other than that, it's the entranceway by the 18 gatehouse. 19 So, there was just some discussion with 20 Natural Resources of providing us with the ability to 21 have keys for various gates so that if we needed to use 22 some of the other entry points that that was available to 23 us. 24 25 (BRIEF PAUSE)

1 Q: Deputy Carson, up on the screen is a 2 copy of Exhibit P-40, it's a copy of the Military 3 Reserve, the Army Camp, and in the upper left-hand corner 4 is the Provincial Park and if I might -- and there's a 5 copy, actually, on your -- the desk in front of you. 6 A: Yes, I've... 7 Q: Have you got it? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: And, there should be a black pen 10 that's on the... 11 Now, perhaps you could identify the 12 entrances that you were concerned about with respect to 13 the Provincial Park, and I might just outline this again. 14 15 Matheson Drive is this black line that 16 runs from the Army Camp Road, which is on the left-hand 17 side of this or the west side of this Exhibit P-40; it 18 runs east and then north to the beach? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: And on each side, on the Park side, 21 back in 1995, and on the Military side there were fences 22 that -- between Matheson Drive and the Army Camp on one 23 (1) side, and the Park on the other side? 24 A: Correct. On the Park side was a 25 significant, probably about a -- if my memory serves me

1 correctly, but an eight (8) -- eight (8) foot chainlink 2 fence, and on the Military side, a standard farm page 3 wire fence. 4 Q: Page wire fence on the... 5 Then, the entrance to the -- where the 6 maintenance shed area was -- is, I think I've -- this 7 black line that runs north from about a third of the way 8 along Matheson Drive? 9 A: That's fair, yes. 10 Q: Could you mark that with a number "1" 11 on your copy of Exhibit P-40 and I would ask that the 12 copy that Deputy Carson is marking be marked the next 13 Exhibit, it would be 422, I believe. 14 THE REGISTRAR: P-422, Your Honour. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 422. 16 17 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-422: Document Number 1002409. Map 18 of Ipperwash Military Reserve 19 and Ipperwash Provincial Park 20 marked by Witness, Mr. John 21 Carson. 22 23 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 24 Q: Then, on the east side of the Park 25 there's an entrance just -- there's a road that appears

1 to run east/west inside of the Park, just below the 2 number "590" and I understand there's an entrance there? 3 A: In that general vicinity, yes. 4 Q: And, could you mark that as number 2? 5 6 (BRIEF PAUSE) 7 8 Q: Then, the main gate or main entrance 9 to the Park is off Army Camp Road and it runs to -- to 10 the east off Army Camp Road; in the area there's a black 11 line, and then it says, "gate", do you see that? 12 A: Yes, sir. 13 Q: And, is that your understanding of 14 the main entrance into the Provincial Park? 15 A: That's approximately -- that's 16 correct. 17 Q: And, could you mark that with the 18 number 3? 19 20 (BRIEF PAUSE) 21 22 Then along the main entrance to the Park 23 there's a -- and it's not shown on this particular 24 drawing, but there's a gatehouse, or a kiosk; is that 25 correct?

1 A: Yes, there is. 2 Q: Or there was? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: And when we see -- come later to a 5 reference to kiosk, it's the gatehouse that was located 6 on the entrance into the Park? 7 A: Yes, sir. 8 Q: And the road would then, from that 9 kiosk, ran to the main east/west road that's marked on -- 10 you can see on this copy of Exhibit 422 that's on the 11 screen? 12 A: Yes, it swings around and connects 13 with it. 14 Q: Connects with that road? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And on this map there's a little 17 black square, and it's my understanding that represents 18 approximately where the Park store was? 19 A: Yes, sir. 20 Q: And that's your understanding as 21 well? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: And then there's an entrance with a 24 gate at the end of this road. The road runs by the Park 25 store, and there's a gate that leads out to what we've

1 referred to as the Sandy Parking Lot, but it's the access 2 road to -- to the beach? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: And you're aware of a gate being 5 there? 6 A: Yes, there's a farm-style gate if I 7 remember correctly. 8 Q: And could we mark that, it would be 9 number 3 -- number 4, excuse me. And beside that, to the 10 north of that gate, there's a turnstile; are you familiar 11 with that, sir? 12 A: Yes, there was a turnstile there. 13 Q: And that turnstile permitted people 14 to come back and forth into the Park? 15 A: Right. You could park in that Sandy 16 Parking Lot and come through on foot. 17 Q: And in the area, in the northwest 18 corner of the Park, in this area, was the -- there was 19 parking for cars, it was principally a parking lot in 20 this area? 21 A: Yes generally; that was like an 22 overflow parking area. 23 Q: For day campers or? 24 A: I think they use it for day campers, 25 but I believe they also used it for -- if say a campsite

1 had several vehicles and couldn't accommodate the number 2 of vehicles the camper had. 3 Q: And there was as well, in the Park, a 4 reservoir and a pump-house, is that correct? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And they were at the end of the road 7 that ran north from the maintenance area, and just to the 8 northwest of this intersection of -- that you could see 9 on the map? 10 A: Correct. 11 Q: And in fact there's a bridge that -- 12 at this point, to the west of the pumphouse and 13 reservoir, that ran across the creek? 14 A: Yes there is. 15 Q: And we can see the bridge. And that 16 -- that's the bridge in that area that I've pointed to 17 right now? 18 A: That's right. 19 Q: And so that with respect to people -- 20 the OPP officers being boxed-in in the Provincial Park, 21 and the reference to the MNR, it's simply to get keys to 22 the various gates? 23 A: Yes, and if my memory serves me 24 correctly, there was some discussion about -- I think 25 there was some concrete blocks that may have been

1 blocking those gates -- the gate -- particularly the gate 2 on Matheson Drive at the -- if you call -- I'm not sure 3 which way you are referring to as north here at the -- 4 Q: North actually we've always referred 5 to as the top. 6 A: Okay. The gate that's in this 7 general area, on the east side of the Park then -- there 8 was -- 9 Q: That was gate number 2, I think we 10 marked it. 11 A: Correct. It seems to me that we -- 12 that I had the Ministry of Natural Resources remove the 13 cement blocks that were preventing access through there. 14 Q: So that during the -- the camping 15 season there were normally, it was your understanding, 16 cement blocks along the fence at -- at Gate Number 2? It 17 was normally kept closed? 18 A: Yes, it seems to me we had some 19 discussion about having that available for us to exit 20 through there if we needed to. 21 Q: And so, the cement blocks that were 22 there, you asked to have removed? 23 A: Right. 24 Q: And, perhaps before we leave Exhibit 25 422, we can just mark as number 5 the area where the

1 pumphouse and reservoir and the bridge is, Deputy Carson? 2 A: Yes. 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 Q: Then, we'll go back to the minutes, 7 Exhibit 421. The -- there's a reference: 8 "If you're not available when this 9 occurrence occurs, it is your 10 responsible at any time -- as long as 11 this plan is on, it is your responsible 12 to find a replacement. This is an RCMP 13 model." 14 What's that referring to? 15 A: The -- the model is an org. structure 16 that was taught in the recent past, and we're speaking of 17 September 5 on major case management -- 18 Q: Yes. 19 A: -- which is managing large 20 operations. So, Detective Staff Sergeant Wright had just 21 returned from that training and he was just articulating 22 that the model we were using was based on that particular 23 piece of training. 24 As far as replacement personnel, what I 25 wanted to make sure is that anyone who had a

1 responsibility in this plan, that if for some reason this 2 went on for weeks or months or whatever, that anytime 3 they were not readily available that they had tasked 4 someone else to fill in for them in their absence. 5 Q: So, that -- and we'll come to it 6 shortly, when you look at the organizational chart, the 7 person whose name in any particular box, had a 8 responsibility to make sure there was someone there to 9 fill in for the person if, for some reason, they were 10 unavailable? 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: And then, I take it from the next 13 note that it was discussed that it was each person's 14 responsibility to obtain additional personnel to assist 15 them? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: "And you have to follow the 18 communication line."; what's that refer to? 19 A: Well, the -- the org. chart had a 20 chain of command there and basically it was make sure 21 that the appropriate people were aware of whatever was 22 taking place, whether it was someone replacing them or 23 whatever details they had to make sure that the chain of 24 command was followed appropriately. 25 Q: Excuse me.

1 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: Then, Mr. -- Sergeant Korosec, it 4 goes on, was to be in charge of the ERT teams? 5 A: Yes, he'd be the Coordinator. 6 Q: And, it says: 7 "The team leaders can communicate with 8 each other, but Wright and Carson have 9 to know what is going on. All 10 personnel under the team leaders should 11 be advising their team leaders of any 12 information or suggestions." 13 A: Yes? 14 Q: And, what was that about? 15 A: Just making sure that everybody was 16 in the information loop. If there was -- keeping in mind 17 that when this was occurring on the Friday, we don't know 18 when a deployment would actually occur. I mean, we're -- 19 we are trying our best to strategize what we might think, 20 however, some things don't necessarily work that way. 21 So, Korosec was going to be the overall 22 coordinator or ERT teams, but depending on the timelines, 23 it was hard to say who the first teams that would be 24 called out might be. So, it was just a matter of having 25 points of contact so we had clear lines as to who was

1 responsible for what and that everybody was up-to-date 2 with whatever was the most current information. 3 Q: And the -- it refers to the chart 4 again, so that people have to follow the chart and then 5 there's a note: 6 "Team leaders have to know what is 7 going on. The rationale behind this is 8 so that the team leaders can become the 9 think tank." 10 Is that correct? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: Yes? 13 A: Yes, sir. 14 Q: Now, I note that Inspector Linton's 15 name doesn't appear on this document. 16 A: No, sir. 17 Q: And Inspector Linton ultimately 18 became the incident commander for the night shift, if I 19 might put it that way, when you were off duty; is that 20 correct? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: And why wasn't the incident commander 23 for the night shift -- how would -- how do you refer to 24 the incident commander when you're off duty? 25 A: Yes, he was the -- he was the back up

1 incident commander when -- when I was off. You're 2 absolutely correct. 3 That day, I'm not sure if he was available 4 that day or not. Him and I met. I had certainly 5 contacted him subsequent to this meeting to apprise him 6 of the plans and what the strategy was. 7 Now, I'm not sure -- I'm not sure if he 8 was readily available on that Friday or not or if there 9 was some reason he was unable to attend, but I know him 10 and I had spoke between the Friday and -- and the Monday, 11 we had some significant discussion. 12 In fact, I'd have to check my notes closer 13 here, but I believe him and I actually met somewhere over 14 the weekend and had some discussion to make sure he was 15 up to date. 16 Q: It would have been -- would you agree 17 with me it would have been helpful, though, if Inspector 18 Linton had been able to attend this meeting? 19 A: It would be helpful. It probably 20 would have assisted him somewhat in his role. 21 Q: But, you can't remember why he wasn't 22 there? Did -- was he invited? Did you know at this 23 point on September 1st he was going to be the backup 24 incident commander? 25 A: Yes, that was a discussion I had had

1 with Chief Coles on the Monday when we had the original 2 meeting as, you know, for him. I asked him to let me 3 know who the backup incident commander might be. 4 Q: And then there's a note at the bottom 5 about, again, people being -- understanding the role and 6 you would have to come through the commander or assistant 7 commander. 8 I take it you're the commander? 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: And Detective Sergeant Mark Wright is 11 the assistant commander? 12 A: That's correct. 13 Q: And then you wanted: 14 "Before we leave today, each person 15 will be giving back to Carson what they 16 think their role is." 17 And what's that refer to? 18 A: Well each unit was -- left the 19 meeting and they went away and prepared a plan in respect 20 to their area of responsibility. They were to come back 21 and -- which they did, after lunch, and -- that day, or 22 later in the afternoon, I think it was around two o'clock 23 or whatever, before the end of the day in any event, and 24 presented their plan for my approval. 25 And as a result of that, I -- I approved

1 or asked for modifications in -- in the various 2 disciplines and that became the -- the layers of the 3 plan. 4 Q: Okay. 5 A: I'm not sure I'm clear. 6 Q: No, I understand. We'll come back to 7 that because I'm going to go through those layers. But, 8 if I could just... 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 Q: Let me take you to a document, just 13 before organizational plan, but it's document 2004328. 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 Q: And at page 2, this is a document 18 entitled, Coordinated Investigation Team CIT 19 Organizational Chart? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: And... 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 Q: Now, this is a copy of the chart.

1 Can you tell me, this chart -- copy of the chart -- does 2 not have on it the intelligence box that we'll come to 3 see subsequently in the -- the final Project Maple? 4 A: Right. 5 Q: But, is this the chart that was 6 created on the Monday in your initial meeting by -- I 7 think it was by Detective Sergeant -- I think -- I 8 anticipate the evidence will be that Detective Sergeant 9 Mark Wright, as you say, had come back from a training 10 program and had the -- some software that created this 11 kind of an organizational chart very easily? 12 A: That -- that would have occurred, a 13 meeting, on the Tuesday. 14 Q: On the Tuesday -- 15 A: Yeah. 16 Q: -- August the 29th? 17 A: Right. 18 Q: And -- 19 A: And, I'm not sure that it was as -- 20 how would I put it, as clean a chart as this, the Tuesday 21 chart. My -- my notes here indicate that I received a 22 fax on September the 2nd, which is a Saturday, from the 23 DHQ in Chatham, so that some of the actual boxes and 24 squares as you see them there were completed later in the 25 week.

1 Q: Okay. 2 A: But -- but in -- in rough draft, yes. 3 Q: And, this provided the various -- 4 various duties of individuals, for example, the office -- 5 OIC means Officer in Charge and that's Chief 6 Superintendent Coles? 7 A: Correct. As a Division -- Region 8 Commander, that's -- he has the command of that overall 9 area. 10 Q: And then, you're identified as CIT -- 11 it would be Chief Incident Commander? 12 A: The -- 13 Q: Or, what's CIT mean; Coordinated 14 Investigation Team Commander? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: And then, Mr. Wright -- Staff 17 Sergeant -- Detective Sergeant Wright is identified as 18 the Assistant Commander? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: Then, the other areas, the primary 21 investigator, the file coordinator, the scribe, the 22 records controller fall under Detective Sergeant 23 Richardson? 24 A: Yes, it does. 25 Q: And then, the scene investigator,

1 again, falls under Detective Sergeant Richardson and 2 that's Detective Speck? 3 A: Correct. 4 Q: And, these people are all reporting 5 initially to Detective Sergeant Mark Wright? Have I read 6 that correctly? 7 A: That's right. 8 Q: And then, there's an Ident. person in 9 that first -- on the left-hand side -- 10 A: Yes, that's Paul Evans -- Senior 11 Constable Paul Evans. 12 Q: Then, arrest teams without anyone 13 identified and then secondary criminal investigations 14 investigators? What's PRN mean? 15 A: I'm not sure. 16 Q: Okay. Then, we have the media 17 liaison, Sergeant Babbitt, administration -- 18 administrator Staff Sergeant Bill Dennis and under him, 19 Sergeant Grant and the Finance Manager Staff Sergeant 20 Japp. 21 And then the next box is Emergency 22 Services with identified ERT, the Emergency Response 23 Team, under Sergeant Korosec and then the TRU team, 24 Tactical Rescue Unit, under Sergeant Skinner with the 25 four (4) teams, Number 1, Number 2, Number 3 and Number 6

1 District? 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: And, that's the way it ultimately 4 played out? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And, the negotiator team has listed 7 at this point, Sergeant Seltzer? 8 A: Yes, he's the team leader. 9 Q: And, in effect, you'll have -- you 10 have in front of you a copy of a little book called, 11 Project Maple; it's in the small -- the -- the small 12 folder. 13 But the ultimate plan that was -- 14 organizational chart that was approved is the same as 15 this, but there's a box, Intelligence Detective Sergeant 16 Bell, that's drawn into the left of the line from primary 17 investigator down towards the scene investigators; is 18 that correct? 19 A: Right. 20 Q: And when was that -- that box appears 21 to have been drawn in -- the box itself in -- in hand as 22 opposed to a computer generated, do you know when that 23 box was added, Deputy Carson? 24 A: My best guess is when I -- and I'd 25 have to look at the other copies of the Project Maple.

1 The copy you're referring to is -- I'll just double check 2 here. Yes, the copy you're referring to is a copy of my 3 original copy. 4 Q: Yes. 5 A: So, that would have been added on the 6 Saturday when I received the fax from Chatham and prior 7 to the binders being assembled which was Saturday 8 afternoon. 9 Q: Okay. And can you tell me why there 10 wasn't an intelligence box in the chart originally? 11 A: I don't think there was any 12 particular reason. 13 Q: Then if we could go back to the 14 minutes. It goes on to say at page 3: 15 "Situation variables will arise within 16 the operation. It is up to each person 17 to expect to deal with all situations. 18 You have to modify your thinking and 19 act accordingly. Each person is to -- 20 attending with the problem and an 21 answer to that problem. 22 Solutions have to be thought of prior 23 to letting the Commander know." 24 And that's simply to avoid -- you wanted 25 everyone to think for themselves but try to come up with

1 solutions and not delegate up the solution to you as 2 incident commander. 3 A: Well I think this is subsequent to 4 the earlier discussion about the team leaders being part 5 of the think tank and that I wanted them to come up with 6 solutions so that we were discussing solutions, not just 7 discussing problems. 8 Q: All right. And then uniformed 9 members were going to come under Sergeant Korosec and the 10 ERT leaders? 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: And they were going to be members 13 other than the ERT team member? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: As opposed to -- the uniformed 16 members that are being referred to here, were they part 17 of the ERT team or separate officers? 18 A: Which note are you referring to, sir? 19 Q: On page 3, Deputy Carson -- the one 20 (1), two (2), 3rd line -- paragraph down. 21 A: Oh, yes, correct. That would be if 22 we were using uniform members outside of the ERT teams, 23 that the ERT team leaders would coordinate their 24 activities. 25 Q: The plan as it was being discussed

1 however on September the -- the 1st was that the officers 2 would respond would be all ERT team officers? 3 A: Yes. That -- that was our preference 4 is that we could use those assigned ERT team people 5 specifically and not have to impose or -- well, the 6 Detachment still has a Detachment to run so we were 7 hoping that we could avoid having to use all the local 8 resources. 9 Q: Okay. And the four (4) ERT teams 10 would be a total of sixty (60) officers; fifteen (15) 11 officers per ERT team? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: Then there's a note: 14 "Kids and women may be used on the 15 front line by the Natives." 16 And what was being referred to there? 17 A: Oh, the other circumstances we had 18 watched was the issues at the Military Base when the 19 school bus incident took place in late July and the 20 exercise in 1993 with the toll booth incident, there had 21 been children involved so we were discussing here that 22 women and children may very well be involved in this. 23 So, it just -- we were just having a 24 discussion about how we're understanding and prepared for 25 that eventuality.

1 Q: And when you refer to the bus 2 incident in July and women and children, what are you 3 referring to there? 4 A: The fact that -- that women and 5 children were in and amongst the occupiers when they were 6 dealing with the Military, and when our personnel 7 attended. 8 Q: Then the next paragraph: 9 "An -- an inventory has been done of 10 all the policewomen in the area. We 11 will be using a lot of women, one (1) 12 girl and one (1) guy will be put 13 together." 14 What's that refer to? 15 A: Well, if we were going to be in -- in 16 the cohabitation role, I guess, and if there were issues 17 where they were a lot of women occupiers, and children, 18 that we wanted to make sure that we capitalised on using 19 our female officers, if that was, in fact, the case. 20 So that's going to be something that was 21 subject to discretion at the -- the time of the event. 22 Q: Then there's a note: 23 "Suggestion - passive situation - 24 Korosec could look after that. Serious 25 situation - another sergeant could look

1 after this problem." 2 And what's that refer to? 3 A: I'm not sure what that is, 4 specifically. 5 Q: And then there's a note that -- with 6 respect to primary investigation is going to be Detective 7 Sergeant Richardson. 8 A: Yeah. 9 Q: Is that correct? 10 A: That's right. 11 Q: And file coordinator. What is the 12 role of file coordinator? 13 A: Well, it's controlling all the -- the 14 reports that relate to any particular investigation; so 15 you may have things like the actual occurrence reports 16 that need to be recorded, you may have Crown Briefs that 17 need to be prepared, if there are arrests there may be 18 Show Cause Briefs, necessary to be developed, there may 19 be search warrants necessary. It's -- so it's a 20 coordination of all the files relative to a case. 21 Q: And we'll come back to him, but he -- 22 did -- this paragraph identifies a number of tasks that 23 Detective Sergeant Richardson was responsible for? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And including, as you said, the

1 arrest packages -- packages for the investigation team. 2 "Chart has been set up by Parent to be 3 used by everyone on the ground. It 4 will -- this will give us to what your 5 authority is in the event ERT is put in 6 the Park." 7 Can you tell us what that's referring to, 8 Deputy Carson? 9 A: I believed he developed a chart 10 identifying various charges that may apply in certain 11 circumstances. 12 Q: Okay, now it says: 13 "Karen Shaw will be the scribe. She 14 will follow Inspector Carson around." 15 And can you just explain to us who, at 16 this particular time Karen Shaw was, and what the role of 17 a scribe -- the scribe was? 18 A: Karen Shaw was one of our 19 administrative assistants working out of the District 20 Headquarters at Chatham at that time, and she -- she was 21 going to be appointed as the scribe. 22 The scribe duties are to literally shadow 23 the Incident Commander, basically take the notes of an 24 Incident Commander. Just a little history there, once 25 upon a time, an Incident Commander would write their own

1 notes, but that becomes very problematic when there's a 2 number of issues happening simultaneously and people 3 talking, that it's hard to capture the essence of -- of 4 the notes. 5 So, in fact, we were going to appoint a 6 scribe and that's what we had been doing for a number of 7 years, actually, in any of our major incidents, is that 8 someone would take the responsibility of being the 9 scribe, and take the information that the Incident 10 Commander desired to be captured for his notes. 11 Q: And when you say, "what the Incident 12 Commander desired to be captured for his notes", what do 13 you mean by that? 14 A: Well, normally what I do, my practice 15 now -- just to put it in context, you know, the scribe 16 process has kind of evolved over the years, but at that 17 point in time when I would go to an incident, I would -- 18 someone would be assigned as scribe, quite often it was a 19 constable just happened to be in the wrong place at the 20 wrong time, but what I normally would do is assign them; 21 they would be given a pad of paper and say, if I give 22 direction to anyone, or if anyone provides me with 23 information in regards to what's going on here, I expect 24 you to capture that, and at the end of the day, that 25 becomes the notes.

1 There's no exact science to that, it's a 2 very daunting task at times, quite frankly. You find 3 scribes who are better at it than others, and you find 4 sometimes that some people are better able to capture the 5 essence of the conversations; because what happens is you 6 get into some of these meetings, you get several people 7 who are discussing a matter and there is, you know, 8 trying to get the context of what's being said that's 9 important to the Incident Commander. 10 Q: And how would the individual scribe 11 know what was important to the Incident Commander unless 12 you told the scribe -- pointed it out to the scribe? 13 A: Generally speaking a couple of 14 things; I -- I normally tell the scribe, in those days, 15 that if anybody provides me information that I'm making 16 decisions on, or if I give direction, I want that 17 captured. 18 Those -- those are the things that were 19 particularly important. Sometimes information would come 20 in from various sources, whether it's over the radio or 21 whether it's over the -- by telephone, and the scribe may 22 be directed to, you know, make a note of this, for 23 instance. 24 And I think back to some of my other 25 tactical calls I've done over the years. For instance,

1 if a tactical team wanted permission to deploy a certain 2 technique, well I'd make sure I'd say to the scribe, make 3 sure you capture that I've given approval for them to do 4 a, b, c. 5 Q: And there were, as we will see when 6 we come to the scribe notes, scribe notes that were typed 7 and scribe notes that were handwritten and then typed. 8 Back in 1995, how did the -- how did it 9 work that -- how did the typed -- the handwritten scribe 10 notes become typed scribe notes? 11 A: The -- most of the scribes would -- 12 would do it by hand, or often do it by hand, depending on 13 their level of expertise with the computer. Now, in '95 14 computers weren't -- we didn't have the proliferation on 15 them as we do today. 16 So I -- I believe we had one laptop in the 17 command post as opposed to -- as we see, in this room, 18 today. It just wasn't -- we just didn't have the access 19 to the number of units. 20 Anyway a long story short, is to say that 21 most often the -- the scribe would do them by hand, and 22 then either type them in themselves, into a log, or have 23 someone do that for them. 24 In this particular case, Karen Shaw, I 25 believe that she took some by hand, and also she did some

1 typing. Of course she's a -- a administrative staff who 2 has some significant typing skills, as opposed to say a 3 constable who is a two-finger typists. So it -- it can 4 vary drastically from one scribe to another quite 5 frankly. 6 Q: And back in 1995 at this incident, as 7 we will see, there were a number of different scribes 8 during the day and during the night. 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: Different scribes? 11 A: Yes. Oh, yes. 12 Q: And as Incident Commander, were you 13 given the handwritten notes or the typed version of the 14 notes? 15 A: I got a copy of the typed version. I 16 -- I had never reviewed the handwritten notes prior to, I 17 would say the recent past. I've seen some of the 18 handwritten notes, but I did not review handwritten notes 19 at all during this event. 20 Q: And the scribe notes, once typed up, 21 and we'll get to them but where did they, for example, 22 the events of September 4th, where were the scribe notes 23 kept; once they were typed, where were they kept 24 physically? 25 A: Well I -- to this day I've kept one

1 copy that as -- as they were produced. I had a binder 2 that was a running copy of them, and there were several 3 copies made for -- one for the command post, obviously, 4 and I kept one for myself, and to this day, I've kept 5 that one copy. 6 Q: And so the -- when you -- as they 7 were produced, thinking back to September of 1995, can 8 you -- how was that process; how often would you get a 9 scribe note having been typed up, and how often would 10 that happen? 11 A: Again I'm going by memory, but they 12 were done daily or by the shift. Like we certainly 13 wanted them fairly up to date, so like it wasn't two (2) 14 days later, it was within -- within hours normally. 15 Whenever there was any opportunity the scribes were 16 trying to maintain that log. 17 So they -- they could have been, you know, 18 printed out several times during the day in fact. But, 19 you know, I -- I can't say in all certainty that happened 20 everyday, or not everyday, depending on how busy and how 21 talented the scribe was to be able to work that in. 22 Q: And when you received the pages of 23 the scribe notes from the typed page of the notes, what, 24 if anything, did you do with them before you put them in 25 your binder?

1 A: They were just put directly into the 2 binder. During those days, September the 5th and the 3 6th, quite frankly I didn't have an opportunity to go 4 back and review them. 5 Q: So that when you received them, you 6 simply put them in the binder, you didn't look at them 7 and review them? 8 A: No. The only thing I did is I -- I 9 certainly viewed or -- or was aware of the highlights of 10 certain events. Say, for instance, overnight certain 11 things would happen, I would certainly focus in on -- on 12 -- on events, but to go through it, page by page, and 13 review all the notes, I -- I didn't have an opportunity, 14 or I didn't do that. 15 Q: And, I understand, since 1995, th 16 scribe position has become much more, for want of a 17 better word, formal; there's now a scribe course? 18 A: Yes, that's correct. We have -- it 19 has developed over time, and certain individuals have 20 volunteered to be scribes who have the prerequisite 21 skills, and there is training provided for them to have 22 an understanding of what is required of them. 23 Q: Then, if we go back to Exhibit 421, 24 and just go through the discussion on September the 1st, 25 there is a person that we've already spoken of --

1 identified of as a Records Controller, she's to create 2 documents -- then Media Liaison. The role of Media 3 Liaison, Doug Babbitt -- Sergeant Babbitt -- was it's 4 scribed here, will be script writer. Can you tell us a 5 little bit more about his role? 6 A: Well, he's the media contact, it 7 would be up to him to coordinate all the personnel that 8 were required to assist there, and work with the media 9 outlets in regards to the media relations role. 10 Q: And, we'll come to -- there's a 11 little more description in -- in Project Maple. Then 12 there's a note: 13 "It's everyone's responsibility to find 14 their assistant." 15 I take it that refers to everyone 16 generally that were part of the plan? 17 A: Yes. They -- they were each 18 responsible for tasking additional personnel, as 19 necessary, to carry out their role. 20 Q: And then, at the top of the next 21 page, page 4: 22 "This could be a major drain of our 23 resources." 24 And, what does that refer to? 25 A: Well, the -- the paragraph starts

1 with a chart as a -- as ongoing whenever this incident 2 occurs, and it would -- we certainly had no appreciation 3 of how long it might last. 4 And that while we had anticipated using, 5 for instance, the four (4) ERT teams in Southwest 6 Ontario, if this was a protracted incident, it's possible 7 that we'd have to consider resources far beyond that 8 geography, and that it had the potential of being a 9 strong or a -- a major draw on our human resources, you 10 know, beyond the jurisdiction of Southwest Ontario. 11 Q: And, at this point on September 1st, 12 what was your thinking, if you can recall, as to how 13 long, assuming an occupation took place, how long it 14 would last? 15 A: Well, if it went into an occupation 16 similar to -- I mean, we were already two (2) years into 17 the issue with the Military Base around that particular 18 incident, and so I certainly wasn't under any 19 preconceived notion this was going to be a -- a six (6) 20 hour event, but I had no idea because -- of how long it 21 may go, because the majority of the time period would be 22 controlled by the ability of the Minister of Natural 23 Resources to get an injunction if that's the route that 24 had to be taken given the circumstances. 25 Q: Okay. Then, there's a note:

1 "Intelligence will be under Trevor. 2 Analysts will be under Trevor as well. 3 That person will not have any definite 4 responsibilities, will be computer 5 literate to assist with intelligence 6 information to be entered into a 7 database. This will be Jimmy Dyke. And 8 intelligence, is also referred to in 9 Project Maple, and the Intelligence 10 officer -- this is that -- under 11 communication -- under investigation, 12 Deputy Carson, operational plan, 13 Primary Investigator - File 14 Coordinator." 15 Do you see that in your copy? 16 A: Yes, sir. 17 Q: Then it says: 18 "Intelligence officer, Detective 19 Sergeant Don Bell has been identified 20 for this position and will report daily 21 to the primary investigator. He will 22 attempt to identify the demographics of 23 CFB Ipperwash and assist to gather 24 information on the identifies of 25 persons -- of persons unknown to local

1 members." 2 So, was -- Don Bell was going to be the 3 primary gatherer of information? 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: And he would report to Trevor 6 Richardson who was the primary investigator? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And then is it fair to say that there 9 wasn't an analyst engaged during the course of Project 10 Maple, September 4th, 5th and 6th of 1995? 11 A: I guess I would have to agree there 12 was not an analyst engaged. If -- if you're taking it 13 from the perspective of most intelligent -- intelligence 14 style projects, an intelligence analyst does a couple of 15 things. 16 But, what we were talking about here is an 17 individual who would develop a list or identify those who 18 are involved in the Park. So normally an analyst is used 19 to try to forecast or identify ongoing behaviours in the 20 criminal world so to speak by connecting associations of 21 one (1) person to another to another to see if he can 22 start developing patters. 23 But what -- this incident is a little 24 different that a standard intelligence led investigation. 25 So it's important to understand that, you know, the

1 analyst would be in this case, I believe Jim Dyke was 2 identified -- was more to identify a list of people 3 involved as opposed to trying to understand an ongoing or 4 a potential investigation. 5 Q: And you use the phrase 'intelligence 6 led investigation'. Was that a phrase that was known and 7 used ten (10) years ago back in 1995? 8 A: Not in that particular way. I would 9 suggest there was a number of intelligence led 10 investigations where for example, organized crime where 11 our intelligence units within the OPP and other police 12 organizations would work, you know, towards issues with 13 suspects of various criminal organizations. 14 So, while the term wasn't used in the 15 manner it is today, the -- the work was being done in a 16 similar fashion. 17 Q: And the information that -- the 18 intelligence information to be entered into a database, 19 is it fair to say that back in September 4th, 5th and 20 6th, that wasn't done? 21 Jimmy Dyke didn't have an intelligence 22 database? Do you know what -- 23 A: That's -- that's probably fair 24 enough. Probably we had a -- a sheet of -- a manual 25 sheet of list of names of people who were identified in

1 the Park that in fact was more likely the case. 2 Q: And in fact as you say, the -- the 3 job of -- of the intelligence was simply to identify who 4 was in the Park so that you would -- assuming they went 5 into the Park so you'd know who was there? 6 A: Correct. And -- and the other piece 7 that we would expect to be done is if there was any 8 information being gleaned anywhere of sympathizers or 9 supporters from beyond the local area that might be 10 coming to the area. 11 Q: That frankly, isn't it fair to say 12 that was your primary concern, with people who were not 13 from Kettle or Stoney Point; who weren't from this area 14 but were from somewhere else? 15 A: In regards to behaviour, it would be, 16 yes. 17 Q: And in terms of, back in 1995, while 18 we're at this point, the -- what was your view of the use 19 of intelligence in an operation such as this? 20 A: Well, this -- this particular 21 situation was a little different than most because here 22 we're dealing with an incident involving the majority of 23 people from Kettle Point. 24 Most of the people involved, the officers 25 from Forest whether we're talking about the likes of Mike

1 Hudson or Mike Beacock or -- well, and Vince and Luke 2 George who certainly had lived in the area their whole 3 life, the people involved were, for the lack of a better 4 term, were fairly known as local people. So, the 5 intelligence information didn't really feed into the 6 incident and -- and the management of the incident in the 7 way it might in some other examples. 8 For instance, if I needed to know certain 9 things, I probably could ask George Speck because he 10 would probably know the individual personally and 11 probably knew where the person lived and probably could 12 tell you which -- where he lived at and probably a lot of 13 the information around their family members and that kind 14 of information was -- was fairly readily available to me. 15 So, when it comes to the intelligence 16 side, the most important thing that they were doing was 17 (a) identifying who was in there at any given time and 18 (b) was there any movement from outsiders that I need to 19 be concerned of. 20 Q: And, as you said, if you needed to 21 know information, you could ask people like George Speck 22 or others or make calls yourself? 23 A: In fact, I have done that. 24 Q: And, you did that during this 25 incident?

1 A: Yes. 2 Q: And, during -- is it fair to say 3 that, at least with respect to this incident, that your 4 view was that you would not make an operational decision 5 based on intelligence information? 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: And, why is that? 8 A: Because I felt I had -- the 9 information I had was as sound as I could hope for 10 because in my view, I was able to -- for the most part 11 when we had concerns I was able to send people over 12 there. 13 And particularly up until the occupation 14 of the Ipperwash Park it was not uncommon for me to ask 15 Mark Wright or Staff Sergeant Bouwman to go to the Base 16 and see if you can find, you know, so-and-so and see if 17 we can get some discussion on this particular issue and 18 quite often that, in fact, was the case. 19 Q: So, prior to the takeover of the 20 Park, you were operating -- what had happened was, as you 21 say, if you needed to know something you would ask 22 somebody to go either -- to go to the Army Camp and ask 23 somebody? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: And, the person you would ask would

1 be one (1) of the occupiers? 2 A: Right. 3 Q: Perhaps that would be a good time for 4 the morning break? 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. Thank 6 you. 7 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 8 for fifteen (15) minutes. 9 10 --- Upon recessing at 12:00 p.m. 11 --- Upon resuming at 12:15 p.m. 12 13 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 14 resumed. Please be seated. 15 16 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 17 Q: Deputy Carson, if I could take you 18 back to Exhibit 421, Inquiry Document 3000574, and if I 19 could take you -- we were talking about the intelligence. 20 The next note is administrator Bill 21 Dennis. He was responsible for logistics, feeding the 22 officers and other things as we will see? 23 A: Correct. 24 Q: And the operational plan that's 25 referred to is project maple when it's ultimately put

1 together? 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: And why everyone will get a copy of 4 the operational plan, you're referring to the various 5 leaders of the various -- the leaders of -- and 6 responsible for various tasks. 7 A: Yeah, all the responsible managers. 8 Q: And then the note says: 9 "if the ERT goes in and they take the 10 place, we will move at least two (2) 11 ERT team units inside the perimeter of 12 the Park. Stan and TRU will come up 13 with this part of the operational plan. 14 The area around the park will be 15 cordoned off with ERT as well as road 16 blocks by uniform. Stan will be the 17 overall person in charge of ERT. There 18 will be two (2) ERT sergeants, one 19 inside the Park and one outside. 20 The sergeant outside of the Park could 21 also look after the uniform members 22 outside the Park. 23 This is going to be a tough job. With 24 the command trailer you would be able 25 to commute -- communicate with the

1 trailer. Communications should not be 2 a problem." 3 And I take it that what's being described 4 here, and correct me if I'm wrong, is a cohabitation, 5 where you had ERT team members in the Park along with the 6 occupiers? 7 A: That's accurate, yes. 8 Q: And then: 9 "Five (5) sergeants should be able to 10 coordinate the uniform members, keeping 11 the ERT sergeants on the lay of the 12 land. Should be able to cover all the 13 uniformed members needs. Steve 14 McDonald could be used as the new 15 sergeant." 16 And there, you're referring to uniform 17 members as all of the police officers, the ERT teams as 18 well as others? 19 A: Yes, that's correct. 20 Q: And then: 21 "Even if this is peaceful, the best we 22 could hope for is to see a Court Order 23 twenty-four (24) hours later. While 24 we're waiting for the injunction, the 25 ERT and TRU will be there, working

1 operation -- operational [excuse me]. 2 The reason for containing is we are 3 trying to stop any additional people 4 coming into the Park. 5 We cannot stop anyone from going right 6 up to the fence of the Ipperwash 7 Provincial Park. This includes the 8 press when there is no injunction." 9 And this paragraph, again, refers to a 10 cohabitation between the Ontario Provincial Police and 11 the occupiers? 12 A: That's right. 13 Q: And: 14 "If someone crosses the road block, 15 there is an obstruction. As your outer 16 perimeter moves out, the obstruction is 17 still there." 18 And what does that refer to? 19 A: It just -- it just speaking to the 20 fact that once it's necessary to put road blocks in place 21 and having some discussion about the offence of 22 obstruction. 23 Q: So, that -- if there's a -- does that 24 refer to -- and if -- if you have a road block and a 25 person is told they cannot go beyond the road block, they

1 go beyond the road block, then they can be arrested for 2 the -- the idea was to arrest them for obstruction? 3 A: Correct. 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 Q: And had you considered at this point 8 in time the possibility of new people entering via the 9 Army Camp? 10 A: That was not an option. 11 Q: What do you mean it wasn't an option? 12 A: We didn't believe we had safe access 13 in and out through the Military Base at all. That was 14 not considered -- 15 Q: No I think I'm -- I misspoke myself. 16 Were you concerned, and did you consider, trying to 17 prevent the possibility of people going into the Army 18 Camp, going from the Army Camp to the Provincial Park? 19 A: Oh. We certainly were of the -- we 20 were -- conceptions that there would be people trying to 21 come through in that particular -- using that road, yes. 22 Q: And could you prevent that in your 23 view? 24 A: It was going to be difficult. 25 Q: And you would have to prevent it at

1 Matheson Drive, the perimeter around the Provincial Park? 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: Is it fair to say you could not 4 prevent people going into the Army Camp if they wished to 5 go into the Army Camp? 6 A: No. We thought we had no authority 7 to prevent that? 8 Q: Then there's a reference to, "Canine 9 is also required."l; that's canine division -- a police 10 officer with -- 11 A: The dog handlers. 12 Q: -- with a dog. And, "ambulance 13 services is also required." 14 And what was discussed with respect to 15 ambulance services? 16 A: Well, part of the issue there is in 17 the Forest area -- I mean, that we -- we -- it's just an 18 anticipation that ambulance services could be required. 19 But the ambulance service in the Forest area, I'm sure 20 you've already heard this, while it's available twenty- 21 four (24) hours, the -- the crews for the ambulance 22 service have to be called out to respond to calls after 23 certain hours. 24 So, I was aware of that having worked -- 25 worked in this area for some time and I believe I was

1 apprising the -- the team of that logistic. 2 Q: So that -- who was responsible, do 3 you recall for arranging ambulances if they were 4 required? 5 A: Off the top of my head I don't know. 6 But it seems to me that's something one of the logistics 7 members would have probably been tasked with. 8 Q: Then marine -- the plan was to have a 9 marine boat brought in from either Forest, Kincardine and 10 Sombra or Sombra? 11 A: Correct, 12 Q: And the H.A. Graham came in I think 13 from Kincardine ultimately? 14 A: Yes. Well, it was used part of the 15 time, yes. 16 Q: Part of the time. And it says: 17 "This will cordon off the area. The 18 water of the lake, off the lake is very 19 shallow. It is not exactly a docking 20 area and therefore not accessible." 21 Was one of the purposes of a marine boat 22 to try to prevent people coming into the Provincial Park 23 from the lake? 24 A: Yes. We wanted to monitor the 25 potential water access. There is a boat -- a boat ramp

1 there where you could drive a small boat up to that 2 point. But generally speaking, the water directly off 3 the -- off the Provincial Park is quite shallow. 4 Q: Okay. 5 "The two (2) UC officers will be 6 leaving Monday." 7 I take it that's undercover officers? 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: "Monday evening at 6:00 pm. all 10 campers have to leave the Park as the 11 Park completely closes. This is 12 expected when this happens. Number 1 13 District ERT is in there now and they 14 are not leaving until Tuesday." 15 And what does that refer to? 16 A: It simply means that the Park closes 17 Monday evening and the ERT team from Number 1 District or 18 the Chatham team will be staying doing patrols until 19 Monday -- until Tuesday morning. 20 Q: And was Sergeant Korosec part of 21 Number 1 District ERT team? 22 A: Yes, he's the team leader. 23 Q: And then the next paragraph: 24 "The reason we are getting the 25 injunction as it gives us all the

1 criminal code charges. MNR is 2 literally prepared to go into Court in 3 a minute's notice. MNR has clear 4 title." 5 And what are you referring to there? 6 A: Well, we were just talking about the 7 fact that the Ministry of Natural Resources will proceed 8 with an injunction if there is an occupation and that the 9 legalities of having an injunction provides us some, not 10 only direction but contravention of the injunction 11 provides us some criminal code support and how we manage 12 the criminal code offences. 13 Q: For violating -- presumable for 14 violating a court order. 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: And then it goes on: 17 "All the people who have a command role 18 will be notified when the Natives enter 19 the Park immediately. This chart moves 20 as to what we have occurring at that 21 time. Each person will have to make 22 decisions as to where we are now. 23 Charlie will have to notify everyone at 24 Force Detachment to leave when this 25 incident occurs.

1 The OPP thinks the Natives are not 2 aware how prepared the OPP are. The 3 trailer will move into Forest and it 4 will automatically become the command 5 post." 6 And what was being referred to and what 7 was the discussion around this point? 8 A: This is just, again, an up -- making 9 sure that everybody's on the same page and understands 10 exactly what -- what occur should an occupation commence, 11 that Staff Sergeant Bouwman would move his people to the 12 Grand Bend Detachment to operate from that facility and 13 the mobile command trailer from General Headquarters 14 would be moved into Forest and it would be used as the 15 command post for this operation. 16 Q: And, you didn't -- it was discussed 17 at the meeting that you didn't think that the occupiers 18 or potential occupiers were aware how prepared you were? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: Then, just down the page: 21 "Everyone will be staying in the Forest 22 area; pack a bag. Twelve (12) hours on 23 and twelve (12) hours off. This will 24 be the plan." 25 And, that simply refers to twelve (12)

1 hour shifts? 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: And, you expected people to be there 4 for awhile, so they needed a bag of clothes? 5 A: Correct. 6 Q: Then, as you said earlier, there was 7 a break and then in the afternoon people came back with 8 their suggestions for the plan? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: And, I take it there's -- we went -- 11 go through these, there's an indication the flow of 12 communications goes both ways, it goes up and back to the 13 same way, so instructions, questions or information 14 would come up to you through the chain of command as 15 developed in the chart and it would go back down the same 16 way? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: That was the theory? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: The practise didn't work out quite 21 that way? 22 A: Sometimes there's a bit of change in 23 the plans. 24 Q: Then, as we go through there's a -- 25 items identified with respect to each of the areas:

1 Communications, Crime, Administration; things that needed 2 to be done? 3 A: Yes. And -- 4 Q: And, under -- 5 A: -- basically what this does is, each 6 area discusses what they are developing so that all the 7 other managers have an understanding of what's going on 8 around them in the other areas of responsibility. 9 Q: So, that after the morning -- initial 10 morning meeting, people went away and developed plans for 11 their own area and came back and then there was a general 12 meeting? 13 A: Right. 14 Q: And, for example, under 15 Administration: 16 "TRU personnel will be deployed 17 immediately if this goes down to Pinery 18 -- Pinery Provincial Park. This will 19 be discussed." 20 This was -- refers to the fact that the 21 TRU team was going to be housed at Pinery Provincial 22 Park? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And then, on the next page: 25 "Two (2) white boards required for ERT

1 by Korosec; one (1) for ground at Park 2 and one (1) at Forest Detachment. 3 Logistics requires a duty roster from 4 Korosec. When officers are being 5 brought in, the garage at Forest 6 Detachment will be used as a briefing 7 centre. No one should assume that this 8 incident will occur a certain way. 9 There may be many variables that can 10 change the -- any situation. There is 11 no hurry to contain the Park when and 12 if they Natives take over the Park. 13 All ERT members will be reporting to 14 Forest Detachment in the beginning for 15 a briefing, not the incident site." 16 Now, what's being referred to here with 17 respect to the white boards, for example? 18 A: Oh, it's just white boards so that 19 the ERT people have briefing boards. 20 Q: Okay. 21 A: So, that they can just post 22 information as the Team Leaders see fit. 23 Q: And, the briefing was going to take 24 place in the garage at the Forest Detachment? 25 A: Yes, there was a two (2) car garage

1 at the Forest Detachment and that provides sufficient 2 space for the people to assemble and -- and be provided a 3 briefing en masse as one (1) group. 4 Q: And: 5 "There is no hurry to contain the Park 6 when and if the Natives take over the 7 Park." 8 What is that referring to? 9 A: It means that, you know, we're not 10 under any, I hate to use the term sense of urgency, but - 11 - but there is time. There are -- there are -- the 12 people will be deployed, but first of all they'll come to 13 Forest and -- and we'll take our time and do it right. 14 Q: Okay. And, what is the reference to, 15 "not the incident site?" 16 A: Oh, that should be site as in S-I-T- 17 E, not going down to the Park and reporting there -- 18 Q: So, they -- 19 A: -- report to Forest first, not -- not 20 to the location of the incident. 21 Q: So, the -- when they're called in, 22 they go to Forest, not down to the Park? 23 A: Right. 24 Q: Then, Brad Seltzer had a concern, he 25 wanted a separate room for the negotiators only, a

1 separate telephone line for that -- that room; is that 2 correct? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: And was that set up? 5 A: Yes, it was. 6 Q: "ERT and TRU stand. Inner perimeter 7 requires twenty-four (24) men, two (2) 8 teams. Map will be attached with their 9 location. Uniform and equipment issues 10 will be the grey, tactical issues. 11 Long guns to ERT in the trunk. 12 We are going to be on the outside of 13 the fence because if, for some reasons, 14 we're not trapped inside, John's 15 perception is that the main emergency 16 concern is from the camp. 17 Discussion occurred and it will be 18 discussed further, later. Gate at 19 maintenance