1 2 3 IPPERWASH PUBLIC INQUIRY 4 5 6 7 ******************** 8 9 10 BEFORE: THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE SIDNEY LINDEN, 11 COMMISSIONER 12 13 14 15 16 Held at: Forest Community Centre 17 Kimball Hall 18 Forest, Ontario 19 20 21 ******************** 22 23 24 April 1st, 2005 25

2
  1                        Appearances
  2  Derry Millar      )             Commission Counsel
  3  Susan Vella        )    (np)
  4  Donald Worme, Q. C )
  5  Katherine Hensel  )
  6  Jodi-Lynn Waddilove )   (np)
  7  
  8  Murray Klippenstein )            The Estate of Dudley 
  9  Vilko Zbogar       )   (np)     George and George
 10  Andrew Orkin       )            Family Group
 11  Basil Alexander    )            Student-at-Law
 12  
 13  Peter Rosenthal  )              Aazhoodena and George
 14  Jackie Esmonde   )              Family Group
 15  
 16  Anthony Ross     )   (np)       Residents of 
 17  Kevin Scullion   )              Aazhoodena  (Army Camp)
 18  Colleen Johnson  )              Kettle Point & Stony
 19  Jonathon George  )   (np)       Point First Nation
 20  
 21  Kim Twohig       )   (np)       Government of Ontario
 22  Walter Myrka     )
 23  Sue Freeborn     )   (np)
 24  Maureen Smith    )   (np)
 25  Lynette D'Souza  )    (np)

3
  1                   APPEARANCES (cont'd)
  2  Janet Clermont   )              Municipality of 
  3  David Nash       )   (np)       Lambton Shores
  4  
  5  Peter Downard    )              The Honourable Michael
  6  Bill Hourigan    )   (np)       Harris
  7  Jennifer McAleer )
  8  
  9  Ian Smith        )   (Np)       Robert Runciman
 10  Alice Mrozek     )   (np)
 11  Harvey Stosberg  )   (np)       Charles Harnick
 12  Jacqueline Horvat )   (np)
 13  Douglas Sulman, Q.C. )           Marcel Beaubien
 14  Trevor Hinnegan     ) (np)
 15  
 16  Mark Sandler       ) (np)       Ontario Provincial 
 17  Andrea Tuck-Jackson )            Ontario Provincial Police
 18  Leslie Kaufman     )  (np)
 19  
 20  Ian Roland       )   (np)       Ontario Provincial 
 21  Karen Jones      )              Police Association &
 22  Debra Newell     )   (np)       K. Deane
 23  Ian McGilp       )   (np)
 24  Annie Leeks      )   (np)
 25

4
  1                   APPEARANCES (cont'd)
  2  
  3  Julian Falconer  )              Aboriginal Legal 
  4  Brian Eyolfson   )              Services of Toronto
  5  Julian Roy       )   (np)
  6  Clem Nabigon     )   (np)
  7  Adriel Weaver     )   (np)       Student-at-Law
  8  
  9  Al J.C. O'Marra  )   (np)       Office of the Chief
 10  Robert Ash, Q.C. )    (np)       Coroner
 11  
 12  William Horton   )              Chiefs of Ontario
 13  Matthew Horner   )
 14  Kathleen Lickers )   (Np)
 15  
 16  Mark Frederick   )   (np)       Christopher Hodgson
 17  Craig Mills      )
 18  
 19  David Roebuck    )   (Np)       Debbie Hutton
 20  Anna Perschy     )   (np)
 21  Melissa Panjer   )   (np)
 22  Danya Cohen-Nehemia )
 23  
 24  
 25

1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 Page 3 Exhibits 6 4 5 OVIDE MERCREDI, Resumed 6 Continued Examination-in-Chief by Mr. Donald Worme 8 7 Cross-Examination by Mr. Andrew Orkin 64 8 Cross-Examination by Mr. Peter Rosenthal 80 9 Cross-Examination by Mr. William Horton 90 10 Cross-Examination by Mr. Julian Falconer 106 11 Cross-Examination by Ms. Andrea Tuck-Jackson 138 12 Cross-Examination by Ms. Karen Jones 158 13 Cross-Examination by Mr. Peter Downard 185 14 Re-Cross-Examination by Mr. Andrew Orkin 187 15 16 BENJAMIN WAYNE POUGET, Sworn 17 Examination-in-Chief by Mr. Derry Millar 190 18 19 20 Certificate of Transcript 217 21 22 23 24 25

1 EXHIBITS 2 No. Description Page 3 P-310 Document Number 1011697 August 01/95, 4 Toronto Globe and Mail "Ottawa Defends 5 Abandoning Base to Aboriginal Occupiers" 169 6 P-311 Document Number 1001486 September 07/95 7 Ottawa Citizens article "Militants Hurt 8 Aboriginals Across Canada, Mercredi 9 Warns" 179 10 P-312 Document Number 9000567 September 07/95 11 London Free Press Article "Mercredi Fears 12 Indian Cause Has Been Hurt" 180 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

1 --- Upon commencing at 9:03 a.m. 2 3 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 4 now in session. The Honourable Mr. Justice Linden 5 presiding. Please be seated. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 7 morning. Good morning. 8 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Good morning, 9 Commissioner. Before we start back with Mr. Mercredi, I 10 wanted to simply explain to My Friends what they will 11 have found on their tables this morning. We've 12 distributed three (3) documents. 13 The first one is a one (1) page sheet that 14 has number 1 and number 2 on it, and number 1 has the 15 number Exhibit 277. These were the labels from the 16 videotapes from which we made the two (2) DVDs. I 17 anticipate we'll hear that the labels were written by Mr. 18 Ben Pouget. 19 The second set of documents is -- or it's 20 a three (3) page document. And it's a -- they're 21 extracts from a DayTimer that Mr. Pouget had that -- and 22 I've extracted the -- the pages from September 4th 23 through to October 15th, and -- for that time period, and 24 provided it to My Friends. 25 The third document is a larger copy of

1 certain maps drawn by Mr. Pouget. These maps already 2 appear in the database as part of Inquiry Document Number 3 2003822 and, as well, 3000380. These -- these documents 4 are in colour in the original. And I have here with me 5 this morning, for anyone who would like to look at it at 6 the break, for the original colour notes. 7 So I just wanted to make those comments, 8 we will be getting to Mr. Pouget, hopefully, later today. 9 Thank you. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 11 MR. DONALD WORME: Good morning, 12 Commissioner. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 14 morning, Mr. Worme. 15 16 OVIDE MERCREDI, Resumed: 17 18 CONTINUED EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR. DONALD WORME. 19 Q: Good morning, Mr. Mercredi. 20 A: Good morning. 21 Q: Pardon me just for a second. 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 Q: When we had left off yesterday, Mr.

1 Mercredi, we had been hearing you talk about a conference 2 call that you had convened on the 7th of September 1995 3 together with your executive, that appears in these 4 Proceedings and has been marked as an Exhibit 252 and 5 it's found at Tab 10 of the document in front of you. 6 Again, it's Inquiry Document 9000268. And 7 you were confirming for us, Mr. Mercredi, that part of 8 the objective of this particular meeting was to come up 9 with a strategy. And I believe that you were telling us 10 that indeed there was a two (2) part strategy that was 11 arrived at by your group. 12 I wonder if we can maybe just start there 13 and if you could tell us then and take it from there. 14 A: Well, it's impossible for one (1) 15 individual to do all things. So we had -- we had to take 16 the situation that was there as it presented itself, 17 which means that we have to recognize that certain people 18 needed a kind of assistance that could be provided by 19 Elders, but not necessarily assistance that the National 20 Chief can give them. 21 And this is where the role of Bruce Elijah 22 and Bob Antone was directed so that they could spend some 23 time with the people experiencing the most trauma as a 24 result of the death of Dudley George. 25 My role was more to be in contact with the

1 political side of the event which means to try to engage 2 the governments and try -- in dealing with this issue 3 together with Chief Tom Bressette who was the recognized 4 Chief of his community. 5 You can see that in my conversations here 6 with the executive, I asked that question of Chief 7 Bressette whether I should actually go and meet with the 8 Premier as soon as possible. And his response was, come 9 here first, you know, to his community which is -- 10 Q: You were -- you were prepared -- I'm 11 sorry, to meet with Premier Harris at that time? 12 A: It doesn't mean that a meeting was in 13 place but that would have been my strategy would have 14 been to try to secure the meeting and engage him at the 15 outset in terms of political resolution of the dispute. 16 Q: You then indicate to Chief Bressette 17 that you would be prepared to attend out to the -- to his 18 community? That is to the Kettle and Stony Point First 19 Nation? 20 A: Yeah. I indicated right there and 21 then that I would do that, come directly to his 22 community, which is in fact what I did. 23 Q: I think that in the minutes it 24 actually indicates that you would be there at a 25 particular time the following day, which I take it then

1 would be the 8th of September 1995? 2 A: It would have been -- I thought it 3 would have been that same day of the conference call. I 4 -- I don't think I would have waited another day. 5 Q: So you arrived -- you arrived that 6 afternoon? The afternoon of the 7th of September? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And I wonder if you could just go 9 from there, Mr. Mercredi, and tell us what happened? 10 A: I -- I believe I landed in -- in 11 London, Ontario. I think Chief Bressette picked me up. 12 I think this is what happened. And then we came directly 13 to a location where there was many people present. A lot 14 of the people from the community were there. 15 And, as I said yesterday, there was quite 16 a few other First Nations people there that had come to 17 be supportive from the surrounding area, so it was a 18 packed house when -- when -- by the time we arrived. 19 And my -- my recollection of that event 20 was it was an opportunity for the leaders present to 21 provide words of support to the family that had just lost 22 a -- a loved one, but also a chance for the leaders to 23 express their thoughts on the event which was, in fact, 24 done and for them to provide assurances that they would 25 be there to support the people in dealing with -- with

1 their issues or -- or with their problems. 2 I, myself, spoke there and -- as -- as did 3 other Chiefs who were present. 4 Q: And when you say, "spoke there," Mr. 5 Mercredi, what was the location at -- of this event where 6 these words were being exchanged or provided? 7 A: I don't recall where that was, it was 8 inside a building, I remember, but I'm not sure exactly 9 where it was. 10 Q: At the Kettle and Stony Point First 11 Nation? 12 A: I don't remember the location. 13 Q: Fine. You had provided a number of 14 comments as well to various media outlets. I want to 15 draw your attention to -- turn your attention to Tab 13, 16 there's a news article from the Windsor Star. 17 Oh, pardon me, before we go there, perhaps 18 we can go to Tab Number 7, a news article dated September 19 the 7th, '95 bearing Inquiry Document Number 9000567. 20 It's a news article, the headline reads: 21 "Mercredi Fears Indian Cause Has been 22 Hurt." 23 And do you see that, sir? 24 A: Yes, I do. 25 Q: And it seems that, at least the news

1 headline has connected your comments to the standoffs 2 that you had just told us about that you had arrived at 3 from British Columbia, namely the Gustafson Lake matter, 4 and tied together with the incident at Ipperwash. And 5 the comment suggests that it may undo the gains 6 Aboriginal people have made. 7 Do you recognize those comments, Mr. 8 Mercredi? 9 A: Yeah, these comments were made in the 10 context of Gustafson. These are -- not -- not comments 11 directed at the incident in -- in Ipperwash. 12 Clearly -- I mean I have no control of 13 what the Press will do with my comments and how they 14 will, you know, tie them up with new events; that's one 15 (1) of the risks of being a political is that when you do 16 make statements -- public statements -- that you have no 17 control of how they're utilized by the Press. 18 I would not have, at this point in time, 19 made any comments, like I say, about Ipperwash. And, in 20 fact, knowing what occurred, the knowledge that I have 21 now, at no time will I say that now, right? 22 So -- but, these were directed to my 23 observations involving the incident in Gustafson. My 24 comments about the RCMP and -- and the role that they 25 were playing there were as a result of the process that

1 we had worked on together. 2 And I want to tell you that it wasn't easy 3 to -- to persuade them to develop that process for -- for 4 peace making either, that was a setup -- it had -- it 5 took me quite a while and a few angry moments before the 6 -- before that was concluded. 7 Like, negotiations were tough because you 8 know, when the police have a strategy, that strategy 9 takes a life of its own and it takes incredible pressure 10 to -- to divert them from -- from a plan that they've set 11 into place. 12 And I experienced that in -- in Gustafson 13 as we experienced that in Oka as well, and subsequently 14 in Ipperwash I saw evidence of that as well. And clearly 15 it was present when I dealt with the conflict in -- in -- 16 Burnt Church. 17 Like, extremely difficult as an Aboriginal 18 leader to persuade people in power, particularly those 19 engaged in implementing a plan, to reconsider the plan 20 that they have put into place in the interest of -- of 21 public safety or the interest of finding conflict 22 resolution. 23 When I said here -- and I -- I 24 deliberately said what I did here, I did not say this 25 just to -- to one (1) single reporter, I made this at a

1 press conference. I dedicated a press conference to 2 alert my people in Gustafson that we cannot support the 3 use of arms for the purpose of -- of securing our 4 objectives as Aboriginal people for the recognition of 5 our rights. 6 And so it's in that context, you have to 7 understand, it's in that context that I -- I would have 8 formulated this idea that it is counterproductive for our 9 people to use violence as a means to an end, and that it 10 would be -- would be better for us to use, if we're going 11 to be confrontational or if we're going to be involved in 12 direct action; to do all those things in -- in a context 13 of non-violence, which was always my consistent message 14 when I was the National Chief. 15 Q: And -- and just in the middle of that 16 article, Mr. Mercredi, under the headline, "Ipperwash," 17 if I can just read those two (2) paragraphs, it reads: 18 "In Ontario, a renegade group of 19 Aboriginals have taken over Ipperwash 20 Army Base and a nearby provincial park. 21 Neither group has the support of local 22 Chiefs or of Mercredi." 23 Now, I recognize that that is not 24 attributed as a direct quote to you but I do want to give 25 you an opportunity to speak to that if you -- if you

1 wish. 2 A: Like I said, when it comes to direct 3 action on the part of our people, I never discouraged 4 direct action. The only thing I discouraged was the use 5 of force or violence on our part in -- when we get 6 involved in direct action. 7 And while I -- I may have been informed 8 about the -- the separate views present in -- in the 9 context of the land issue here, I would not have 10 deliberately condemned one (1) group. I would not have 11 done that, that would have been inconsistent with -- with 12 my own values as a leader. So it's not something I would 13 have said, that the people occupying the Park did not 14 have my support. 15 Q: Mr. Mercredi, part of the objective 16 that you had told us about of the executive meeting you 17 had convened earlier that day, on the 7th of September, 18 was to facilitate the access to the Army Base of Bruce 19 Elijah and Bob Antone. 20 And I think you've told us that you were 21 successful in that? 22 A: I know that when we concluded the 23 press -- I mean the executive meeting called jointly with 24 the leaders from Ontario, that the decision was made that 25 Gord would go there in advance of myself and that he

1 would go directly to the Park or -- I'm not sure what the 2 terminology is, whether it's Park or -- or Army Camp, but 3 one (1) of those locations where -- where the people were 4 gathered, you know, the ones who experienced the -- the 5 incident the night before. 6 And so his role was to -- was to stay in 7 touch with that community, to work with that community, 8 to deal with the issues facing that community. And I 9 came with -- with the role of dealing with Chief 10 Bressette and the police and the government. So that was 11 essentially the division of labour between myself and -- 12 and Chief Peters. 13 Q: And did you have a chance to meet 14 with either Chief Peters or Mr. Antone or Mr. Elijah upon 15 your arrival on the afternoon of September the 7th? 16 A: Well, they would have been present at 17 the gathering and then -- and then, subsequent to that, 18 we did have a meeting with Inspector Coles and some of 19 the senior -- I don't know what the terminology is but 20 the senior officers, his commanders. And present at that 21 meeting were some of the Aboriginal police officers. 22 And -- and the purpose of that meeting was 23 -- was to engage in -- in a discussion about the 24 aftermath, like, What are we going to do now, what steps 25 are we going to take now to -- to try to resolve this

1 without any further injury to -- to individuals or -- or 2 without any further loss of property. 3 That was the -- the -- the idea behind 4 that and it was set up informally, there was no real 5 structure to it in a sense that no one took the lead 6 role. But it was fairly informal and it began with an 7 expression of sympathy on the part of Inspector Coles 8 about the death of Dudley George but -- and then the 9 meeting ensued from that. 10 Q: I believe his title was, Chief 11 Inspect -- pardon me, Chief Superintendent at that time. 12 A: He was a big man, anyway. 13 Q: But, in any event, he also was 14 accompanied by some Aboriginal officers -- police 15 officers, from the OPP? 16 A: Yeah, there -- there was, yeah. The 17 Aboriginal police officers who were there, I thought -- 18 my impression of them was that they had a very valuable 19 role to play in dispute resolution and they were quite 20 prepared to engage in that process themselves. And I -- 21 I -- and some of them were steeped in -- in culture, I 22 remember, I mean traditional ways. 23 And I remember we -- we -- we had the 24 smudge ceremony as part of that event and it was, in my 25 view, a useful thing to do in light of the circumstances

1 of the previous -- the previous day. 2 And because sometimes when you have these 3 -- these situations emerge, you -- you need a calming 4 effect and -- and people don't always provide that 5 themselves. So that, you know, like -- but a ceremony 6 can have that impact and it was useful for that purpose, 7 so that people could talk more in -- in -- in a calmer 8 more rational level. 9 And -- and my -- my recollection of the 10 meeting is that it -- it -- it -- it began with a fair 11 amount of tension in the air. And you can imagine why 12 that would be because that's obviously where -- where the 13 feelings would start and then when you meet that you 14 would come there with those -- those feelings. 15 And -- but we were there with -- for a 16 purpose and that's to find a way -- a way out of the 17 conflict that would not result in further injury, as I 18 said, or further loss of property. 19 Q: And was that way found? Was there a 20 -- a strategy or was there a plan that was developed as a 21 result of this initial meeting? 22 A: Well, clearly it -- it resulted in 23 giving a message to the police that they would have to 24 obviously revise their plan, the original plan, and that 25 their plan could no longer be implemented as it had

1 pretty much been expended by that time, and that a new 2 approach was required in terms of improving their 3 relationships with the community. 4 But also it was understood, I think 5 clearly, by everyone present that their visibility would 6 be -- would -- would not be welcome in the Aboriginal 7 community, and that as much as possible, their presence 8 should be diminished. And I think that is clearly a, you 9 know, a wise thing to do every -- anytime situations like 10 this emerge or -- or arise. 11 Q: Was there any discussion, Mr. 12 Mercredi, in -- in your recollection at that initial 13 meeting about the preservation of the scene where the 14 incident had occurred? 15 A: There was many issues discussed; that 16 would have been one (1) of them. And the idea of the 17 internal investigation of -- of the incident, that -- 18 that was an issue that was -- that was discussed. 19 We also -- we also talked about the 20 concerns of the cottagers and, you know, the real 21 concerns of the people close to the Park, the concerns 22 about their public safety and we dealt with those issues. 23 In fact, those were issues that were directly addressed 24 by both Bruce Elijah and Gord Peters and they were in a 25 better position to deal with those issues than I was,

1 because I'm not directly involved at that -- at that site 2 as they were. 3 So, they undertook -- they undertook, at 4 that meeting, to visit as many of the cottagers as 5 possible to allay their fears and to assure them that -- 6 that their safety was not a question. 7 And this is something that was not asked 8 of them to do by the police. This is part of the process 9 that they had engaged in. This is an internal thing that 10 -- an internal decision that was made, not at the urging 11 of the OPP and certainly not at their request. It's 12 something that we did internally, but also a decision 13 that was not opposed by the OPP brass, the top brass who 14 were there. 15 I -- I myself in -- in retrospect have a 16 great deal of admiration I think for -- for the role 17 played there by Chief Gord Peters and Bruce Elijah and 18 Mr. Antone. 19 They had the most difficult role in terms 20 of this conflict. While dealing with the government is 21 not easy, I mean in relative terms my role was -- was 22 much easier than theirs. 23 Q: Okay. One (1) of those roles I think 24 you had told us about was to attempt to maintain a focus 25 about this as a political issue.

1 A: You know, this is -- this is not just 2 a matter of philosophy or approach in the part of a 3 leader. This is -- this is really a question of being 4 practical. You know, being realistic, that whenever 5 issues between us and the state or between us and Canada 6 result in confrontation, that it's not only the cooler 7 head should prevail. 8 But governments should -- should already 9 have a policy in place to deal with these matters. Not 10 as law and order issues or rule -- rule of law matters, 11 but issues of political questions that need to be 12 resolved involving leaderships on the part of the 13 Aboriginal community but also on the part of the province 14 or -- or Canada. 15 But, you know, whoever's engaged in the 16 conflict, whichever government's involved. See I 17 formulated this idea, if I -- if I may, when I'm at the 18 Gustafson because with respect to Oka there -- there was 19 dialogue with government. 20 Like I was involved in meetings with the 21 SQ and I was involved in meetings with appointed 22 ministers of the Crown, like Flora McDonald who was a 23 Conservative minister of the Crown. So I was engaging 24 pretty high level discussions to try to deal with that 25 situation in Oka.

23
  1                 And, but in Gustafson, I came to face to
  2  face with an opposition that I didn't expect from the NDP
  3  government.  And that was from Premier Dosanjh, who
  4  clearly didn't understand the nature of my intervention
  5  or my purpose, but obviously disliked it as well and made
  6  it very clear in his public statements that I should
  7  leave this to the police to deal with.  
  8                 And effectively he saw me as someone not
  9  intervening for a good reason but someone coming, I
 10  assume, in his mind, to muddy the waters.  And he thought
 11  it would be better if I was not around.  And he made that
 12  point quite clearly in the public and -- and never made
 13  himself available to meet with me or any of the
 14  leadership.
 15                 And in light of that, if there is no
 16  political role in conflict resolution, that leaves the
 17  Aboriginal leaders to deal with the police.  And the
 18  police are political masters.  And the police they can't,
 19  you know, they can't make the decisions that are
 20  sometimes required because those decisions have to be
 21  made by politicians.
 22                 So the police are placed in these awkward
 23  roles of -- of trying to enforce the law that they may
 24  not necessarily believe in themselves where they see a
 25  grey area.  Because when it comes to Aboriginal issues,

1 certain police officers, at a certain level in the 2 organization, are informed about our rights. 3 And they know that it's not a clear case 4 of -- of us being illegals, of us being against the law 5 or criminals that sometimes when it involves rights there 6 is a grey area that they are prepared to recognize. And 7 it -- it places them in an awkward place of trying to 8 enforce the law. 9 And that's what I'm saying that that's 10 where the politicians have to be involved. And in the 11 absence of the political -- of their involvement, then 12 Aboriginal leaders have no option but to deal with the -- 13 with the law enforcement agencies that are there, which 14 is -- which is what, in fact, I did not only in -- in 15 Ipperwash, but again in -- in -- Burnt Church. 16 Because in Burnt Church we established a 17 process with the RCMP, but they were not in control of 18 the situation. In Burnt Church, like, every -- every 19 situation is unique and in Burnt Church the, you know, 20 the real -- the real danger was from the DFO officers, 21 not the RCMP and the antics and the methods of DFO 22 officers, but we had no process with them. 23 We had a -- a dialogue, communications and 24 an understanding with the RCMP that we would work 25 together towards conflict resolution, but that commitment

1 was not there on the part of DFO. So that was more 2 complicated because you're -- you're dealing with two (2) 3 official agents of the Crown with authority to enforce 4 the law and if one (1) is working with you and the other 5 one isn't, then obviously conflict resolution is made 6 more -- more -- more difficult; less likely to achieve. 7 So, that's, I think, unique with respect to Burnt Church. 8 Q: And you had set up a line of 9 communication, I take it, through this meeting with Chief 10 Superintendent Coles at this meeting of September the 7th 11 along with his -- along with the officers that attended 12 with him. 13 You were -- first of all, can you recall 14 where that meeting took place? 15 A: I don't recall the -- where it was. 16 Q: Okay. Perhaps I can draw your 17 attention to Tab Number 13 in your document binder, it's 18 Inquiry Document 2001766. I believe it is -- it -- it 19 looks to me like the second page continued from page A-1. 20 It reads -- the headline at the top of the 21 page simply reads, "Natives," and in the middle of the 22 second column it would suggest that -- that you flew into 23 Sarnia at 3:30 p.m., arrived at the Kettle and Stony 24 Point Band Office a half hour later and immediately went 25 to a meeting with Stoney Point leaders and provincial and

1 native representatives. 2 I take it that's the, what I'm going to 3 call a rally, that you had first attended to upon 4 arriving? 5 A: Yeah, that's it; that's -- yeah, I 6 think that's it. 7 Q: And then if we can go over to the 8 next column towards the bottom right under the heading, 9 "Native Want -- Natives Want Inquiry," it reads: 10 "Mercredi left the rally at 7:00 p.m. 11 and began meeting with OPP 12 Superintendent Chris Cole at a hotel in 13 Grand Bend. He said the Natives will 14 call for an Inquiry and conduct their 15 own." 16 Does that assist you, sir, in -- in 17 recalling where the meeting took place first of all and-- 18 A: Yeah, I guess if that's what the 19 report says, that's probably where it was. I -- I know 20 it was not in the same meeting as the -- as the -- where 21 -- where the rally was. It wasn't the same -- it wasn't 22 at the same location. We had to drive to this next place 23 for our meeting. 24 Q: You had talked about the police in 25 your -- in your testimony as having political masters,

1 was there any inquiries made in that meeting with Chief 2 Superintendent Coles in that respect? 3 A: You know, there were statements made, 4 I mean, there were statements made about rumours that 5 people had heard about political direction and -- and 6 that was discussed. 7 Q: Was there any -- can you tell us what 8 the outcome of that discussion was, the nature of that 9 discussion, firstly? 10 A: Well, all I remember from that is 11 that it was -- it was not confirmed that there was any 12 political role, but -- that's all I remember from there. 13 Q: In the Gustafson Lake incident you 14 indicated that your attempts to meet with Premier Dosanjh 15 were rebuffed by him, is that -- is that what I 16 understand? 17 A: Yes, yes. 18 Q: And you had indicated earlier that 19 you had inquired of Chief Tom Bressette whether you 20 should go ahead and meet with the Premier of Ontario, 21 Premier Harris, and he had asked you to come to the 22 community first, which you did. 23 Did you receive any subsequent direction 24 insofar as meeting with Premier Harris from there? 25 A: Well, it was understood by -- by all

1 of us that that political meeting was essential, that we 2 needed that political-level meeting. So that efforts 3 were made to secure that and we were not successful in -- 4 in convincing the Premier's office to provide us with -- 5 with that meeting. 6 That's why we had to take this drastic 7 step of -- of telling the -- the public that if he will 8 not meet with us, if he -- if he will not come to us, 9 then we'll go to him. And that, if necessary, that I 10 would occupy, you know, his office until he met with me, 11 that I would go to his place of work and I'd sit there 12 until he met with me. 13 Q: Okay. Now, we'll come to that in a 14 moment. Can you tell us when these overtures were made 15 to the Premier's office? 16 A: I don't -- like -- like I said 17 yesterday, like, the National Chief doesn't do 18 everything, that we have staff that make calls on our 19 behalf. And I don't remember how many calls were made 20 but efforts were made to -- just to obtain that meeting, 21 and those efforts were not successful. 22 Q: If I can have you turn to Tab number 23 12, it is the news article entitled "Natives blame" -- 24 pardon me, "Natives/Police trade blame," and it's dated 25 September 8, '95, Inquiry Document Number 2001765. And

1 it's speaks about you addressing the people at the Army 2 Camp. And you're quoting as indicating that: 3 "It is not necessary for anyone else to 4 die here. Whatever grievance we have 5 with the Canadian government can be 6 resolved in a peaceful way." 7 A: Yeah, that would be consistent with 8 the approach that -- that I would have taken. But 9 clearly, you see, for that -- for that strategy to work, 10 it requires on the -- on the part of the government an 11 equal commitment to that strategy. So that's why it 12 became quite necessary to meet with the Premier so that 13 he would engage in -- in a process towards that end as 14 well. And that was my, in fact, my objective. 15 And quite -- quite apart, there are 16 political objectives. When you -- when you represent 17 your people, you clearly have political objectives. And 18 one (1) -- one (1) of them is to -- is to expose to the 19 public, the Ontario public, how ridiculous it is for a 20 senior political leader of the province to refuse to meet 21 with the leader of -- of the First Nations that wants to 22 bring peace to a conflict. 23 Q: And, indeed, your very next -- 24 A: And the -- and the only way in which 25 you're going to be able to -- to make that apparent to --

1 to the general public is to be prepared to your own 2 people, which I'm always prepared to do, at least at that 3 time when I was their Chief, to say to them, We, you 4 know, we have to find peaceful resolution here. 5 Like, it's not necessary for -- for 6 further injury to occur to anyone and that -- because you 7 can't -- you can't double-minded about these things. You 8 have to either believe in non-violence for -- for your 9 people and -- and non-violence for the other people as 10 well. You can't just believe in non-violence just for 11 one (1) -- one (1) camp. 12 Q: And it would appear at that time, on 13 the 8th of September, you had indicated or at least are 14 reported as saying that: 15 "Ontario Premier Mike Harris has 16 refused to meet with him to address the 17 dispute." 18 So I take it by the 8th of September that 19 -- that overture had already been made to that office? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: Just before I leave this -- this 22 area, Mr. Mercredi, at the meeting of the 7th of 23 September with Chief Superintendent Coles and others, I 24 take it that the Kettle and Stony Point First Nation was 25 represented there?

1 A: I don't remember if there was a -- an 2 appointed leader from that group at that meeting. All I 3 recall is that Gord Peters, and I think, Elijah, Bruce 4 Elijah, I'm not even -- I don't remember if even Antone 5 was there but I know Bruce Elijah was there. 6 Q: I'm sorry, I may not have been clear. 7 I was talking about the Kettle and Stony Point First 8 Nation, the Band Council. 9 A: Were they there? 10 Q: Yeah. 11 A: Yes, they were, yes. 12 Q: All right. And then I was going to 13 ask you secondly, whether or not there was 14 representatives there from the Stony Point group, as I 15 think they had been called. 16 A: No, that's the group I'm referring 17 to. They -- they didn't -- they had trust in -- in Bruce 18 Elijah and Gord Peters to -- to be at that meeting. 19 Q: And just to your recollection, sir, 20 was there anybody from among that group, that is to say 21 the Stony Point group that had put themselves forward, at 22 least to you, or anyone in your presence, as being in a 23 leadership capacity from amongst that group? 24 A: At that time, no. And -- no. 25 Q: Can you tell us what -- what you did

1 following this -- following this then, Mr. Mercredi? 2 After the meeting of -- of September the 7th with Chief 3 Superintendent Coles? 4 A: I probably went to bed. I was 5 probably pretty tired by then. And I don't recall any of 6 the meetings, but Tom Bressette and I had met to talk 7 about how we're going to draw attention to the Premier 8 and how we might get the Premier to -- to -- you know, to 9 reconsider his position not to meet with us. 10 And how we might engage in discussions 11 with him. So that's when we developed a strategy. It 12 was very quiet and we didn't really inform that many 13 people, and -- and as a result, he and I left very early 14 in the morning to travel to Queens Park. 15 And the only thing that we did to make 16 sure that there was attention given to this trip that we 17 took was we alerted some media outlets that we were on 18 our way there. And so that they could -- they could 19 follow the story to see where it goes with respect to the 20 goal of meeting with the Premier. And -- 21 Q: Just before you move on, sir, do you 22 recall the date that this would have occurred when you 23 travelled to Queens Park? 24 A: I don't remember the date but -- I 25 don't recall the date.

1 Q: We were told, sir, that the funeral 2 of Dudley George occurred on the 11th of September. 3 A: Hmm hmm. 4 Q: Would -- first of all, did you attend 5 that event? That funeral? 6 A: Yes, I did. 7 Q: And would the trek to Queens Park 8 with yourself and Chief Tom Bressette have occurred after 9 that or before that? 10 A: I don't recall the -- the sequence 11 there. 12 Q: Can I refer you to Tab Number 20 in 13 your binder? And that is Inquiry Document 12000191. 14 There appears to be a news article dated the 12th of 15 September. And the gist of the -- of the article has 16 yourself heading to Toronto to demand a meeting with 17 Premier Harris to discuss the crisis at Ipperwash. 18 A: What date is that? 19 Q: I believe this is the 12th of 20 September I'm told. I don't see an indication on the 21 document itself. 22 A: I think -- I think whatever date it 23 was it would probably coincide with public statements I 24 would have made at that time, following the meeting. 25 Q: All right.

1 A: And I -- I know the Premier made a 2 press release, I think, at that same time and so the date 3 of his press release would indicate the date of my 4 meeting with him. 5 Q: In terms of your attempt, and I -- 6 and I recognize that there are others from among your 7 staff and within the organization that you headed that 8 would have taken on some of the administrative duties, 9 but do you recall whether or not yourself personally had 10 made any calls to the Premier's office? 11 A: I don't recall making calls myself, 12 no. 13 Q: And do you have any idea, sir, how 14 many calls might have been made on your behalf? 15 A: I wouldn't know that either. 16 Q: If I can refer you, sir, to Tab 17 number 14, it's Inquiry Document 12000079, which is an 18 official transcript of Premier Harris's comments to the 19 media from September the 8th of 1995. And at page 2 of 20 that -- pardon me, at page 3 of that -- of that 21 transcript, it's a transcript of the Premier's comments 22 on the Ipperwash situation, dated Friday, September the 23 8th. 24 And if we go to the second page of that 25 portion of this transcript, the question was put to the -

1 - to the then Premier: 2 "Have you talked personally with Mr. 3 Mercredi about this? If so, what was 4 the conversation about?" 5 And the response is indicated as: 6 "No. Mr. Mercredi, to the best of my 7 knowledge, never called my office. He 8 has had officials call on his behalf to 9 ask for a meeting and we've indicated 10 there would be no meeting or 11 negotiations or discussions with me on 12 the Ipperwash situation. This is not 13 the role for any politicians now is a 14 matter of an illegal occupation and a 15 role for the police. But by the same 16 token, we obviously -- our ministers, 17 our office, and myself, we're prepared 18 to discuss any concerns." 19 And I take it this is the response that 20 you were referring to, Mr. Mercredi, in -- in terms of 21 your attempts to meet with the Premier? 22 A: Yeah. His opposition to a meeting 23 was clear. 24 Q: And I'm going to suggest to you that 25 it was on -- on the 12th of September that yourself,

1 together with Tom Bressette and perhaps others, that is 2 Chief Tom Bressette, attended to Queens Park, to the 3 Premier's office? 4 A: As I said, you know, the -- the date 5 when the -- when the papers reported my comments and the 6 -- the Premier's press release, that would be the date I 7 met with him. 8 Q: All right. Can you tell us then 9 about that event, having attended at the Premier's office 10 and what happened? 11 A: Well, there was three (3) of us 12 altogether that -- that went to Queens Park. Chief Tom 13 Bressette and I travelled together by car from here and 14 we met Charles Fox there, one (1) of the Ontario leaders. 15 And when we arrived there, we did a little scrum, what 16 they call a scrum, with the press that were present and 17 reiterated my -- my request for a meeting with the 18 Premier. 19 I should maybe clarify something here, 20 that, in my experience as the National Chief, I -- I 21 learned very quickly that Canadian politicians also talk 22 to each other through the media. They may not always 23 correspond or telephone each other but they talk to each 24 through the media. And that I had learned this quickly 25 during the Charlottetown Accord negotiations.

1 And it -- it happens today. Like, you -- 2 if you pay attention to the media you'll -- you'll every 3 now and then hear a premier talking to someone, you know, 4 like a way of communicating and by using the, you know, 5 the media. 6 So, I learned how to do that myself and I 7 used the -- I used the -- the word's not, "used", I guess 8 I utilized the availability of the media to communicate 9 my intentions to government in regard to this issue and 10 that is my willingness to -- to meet with the Premier. 11 And so when we arrived at the steps that's 12 what I did, I reiterated my -- my call for a meeting. 13 And -- and we were met at the door by an official of -- 14 of -- of the Premier's office, and we were escorted into 15 the building and we were given a room to -- to rest and 16 we waited for some time. 17 And we waited -- I -- I don't know exactly 18 how long we -- we waited, but we -- we did wait long 19 enough for me to lie down on the floor and rest for a 20 bit, you know? I had enough time to do that. 21 Q: All right. And did you -- did you 22 get a meeting? 23 A: Yes. He came with one (1) of his 24 ministers and a young lady, I don't recall her name, but 25 obviously one (1) of -- one (1) of his attaches, I would

1 say, that was with him. 2 Q: And the minister that was with him, 3 do you recall who that person was? 4 A: I -- I don't remember the -- who the 5 other minister was. 6 Q: But he was identified to you as a 7 minister? 8 A: He was clearly a minister, yes, I 9 remember that. 10 Q: And can you tell us what happened at 11 this meeting? 12 A: Well, most of the discussion was led 13 by -- by Tom Bressette, because he is the elected Chief 14 of his community and these are issues facing and 15 confronting his people. So he took the lead role in -- 16 in -- in the discussion with the Premier. 17 And so he -- he raised the issue of the 18 Park and questioned the, you know, the terminology of the 19 illegal occupation of the Park. And I, myself, would 20 have dealt with more the -- the issue of resolving the 21 conflict in -- in -- in -- in a peaceful manner and 22 trying to get the cooperation of the government to that 23 end. 24 We also talked about the idea of -- that - 25 - I'm not sure which of -- which of us raised this issue

1 now; it may have been Tom, it may have been Charles, it 2 could have been me, about the -- our -- our suspicions 3 about an internal investigation and -- and our -- our 4 desire for a Public Inquiry. And, in fact, I think I did 5 report on that to -- to the Press. 6 My impression of that meeting was -- was - 7 - was -- would have been what I said in the media was 8 that the Premier -- the Premier, himself, was not 9 adverse to the idea of a Public Inquiry; that was what I 10 reported, you know. If I said it, it's probably what I 11 sensed or felt at the meeting. 12 Q: Okay. AS a result of this meeting 13 were there any -- any results that -- that you can tell 14 us about? 15 A: Well, we didn't -- we didn't get the 16 -- the -- what my -- my hope was -- was -- was a 17 commitment on the part of the Premier to -- to -- to 18 engage his government in discussions with us towards 19 dealing with the issue of the Park. 20 We weren't expecting him to, at that 21 point, to provide the -- the ultimate solution, but we 22 were expecting him to engage in a process towards that 23 end, but I think Tom Bressette was quite adamant about 24 ensuring that -- that the -- the Provincial Government 25 turns over that land to, you know, to his people. And

1 I'm not sure, you know if the Premier understood our 2 intent because we're certainly not trying to -- to push 3 him into a corner or get him to commit to return the land 4 right there and then. 5 We knew that this would take negotiations 6 and further dialogue and discussion. 7 Q: All right. Just insofar as who was 8 at this meeting I'm going to ask you to turn to Tab 9 Number 24 if you would please, Mr. Mercredi, and that is 10 found at Inquiry Document Number 1003853. 11 It's a Globe and Mail article dated 12 September the 13th, 1995 entitled, "Harris, Mercredi Meet 13 On Ipperwash Issue." And if you go just to the bottom of 14 the first column into the top of the second column, it 15 reports that you had met with the Premier for thirty (30) 16 minutes and continued the meeting for a further half hour 17 with Charles Harnick, Ontario's Attorney General. 18 Does that assist you, sir, in recalling 19 who it was that you would have met with? 20 A: Yeah. It would have been, as I said, 21 another minister, so if the report is it was -- it was 22 him then it's him. 23 Q: And you're reported as indicating at 24 the bottom of that second column, Mr. Mercredi, that the 25 meeting was successful to the extent that it opened the

1 first lines of communication. 2 A: Yeah. It's always important to put a 3 positive, you know, face to meetings in situations like 4 this. And I thought the meeting -- it was -- it was not 5 confrontational. The meeting was -- it wasn't 6 confrontational at all. 7 And -- but the issues were tough 8 nonetheless. Like the issues are tough when you deal 9 with someone's death on the hands of the police. And 10 when people are fearful about what more could happen if 11 steps are not taken to minimize the role of the police in 12 the vicinity. So those are pretty tough issues. 13 Q: And just at the end of the third 14 column, Mr. Mercredi, you have reported Mr. Harris said - 15 - then Premier Harris, as indicating he was not adverse 16 to the idea of looking at an independent inquiry into the 17 shooting as you've just told us here, provided that the 18 report by the Ontario Government, Special Investigations 19 Unit is completed. 20 Do you recall that as being a pre- 21 condition? 22 A: You know, the meeting happened such a 23 long time, like it's hard for me to recall the exact 24 exchange. But like I said, all I can remember is that we 25 did talk about the -- the -- our concerns about the

1 adequacy of internal investigations. And our -- and our 2 interest in public inquiry. 3 Q: Beyond this, Mr. Mercredi, did you 4 have any other dealings, either directly or indirectly, 5 with the Premier's office 6 A: Well, beyond this the -- the Federal 7 Government intervened, right? So the actions of the 8 Federal Government were extremely useful and the decision 9 on the part of Ron Irwin, the Minister of Indian Affairs 10 at that time, to engage his government in constructive 11 action, played an important role in -- in dealing with 12 the -- with the conflict itself, right. 13 So our attention would have turned to 14 that. In fact, our attention turned to that. Because 15 our objective was clearly to engage the -- both levels of 16 government but when the Federal Government indicated that 17 they were quite prepared to assist in terms of trying to 18 resolve the land question involving the Park, we took the 19 opportunity. 20 Q: And did you have direct dealings with 21 any federal officials? Whether Minister Irwin or any of 22 his subordinates? 23 A: I'm not exactly sure of the details 24 in terms of the sequence of events and -- and how we came 25 up with that agreement that was signed.

1 And I'm not exactly sure who would have 2 been engaged in my office negotiating the provisions. 3 But I know for a fact that Tom's office would have been 4 directly involved and his people would have been directly 5 involved in -- in the drafting or at least the input into 6 the drafting of that agreement. 7 Q: If I can refer you, sir, to Tab 8 Number 22 in your document binder and that appears at 9 Inquiry Document Number 1009054. It is a -- appears to 10 be a two (2) page document entitled, "Memorandum of 11 Understanding between the Federal Government's Department 12 of Indian and Northern Affairs and the Chippewas of 13 Kettle and Stony Point First Nation." 14 And it goes on to -- to detail an 15 agreement that evidently was reached on the enumerated 16 seven (7) points, and it bears the signatures on the 17 following page. Certainly your signature is there, all 18 on the 13th of September 1995. 19 That would be the agreement that you were 20 part of negotiating, Mr. Mercredi? 21 A: Yeah, that -- that would have been 22 the agreement that I signed. And whether I was directly 23 involved in negotiating provisions, I don't recall that. 24 But in reading it, I see some of the -- the basic issues 25 that I -- I was familiar with in my discussions with Tom.

1 And, for example, there's references here to the idea of 2 environmental cleanup of the property, which was, I 3 gather, an important issue to the community. 4 And so, clearly, the government was quite 5 willing to -- to try and be helpful, the Federal 6 Government was. Because there was, if I recall 7 correctly, a -- an issue that the community had raised 8 before, to no satisfaction, in their dealings with the 9 Federal Government. 10 So the fact that it was expressed here on 11 the part of the Federal Government, that they're 12 committed to working on a mutually satisfactory 13 environmental cleanup of the property, indicates to me 14 that they were -- they were trying to find ways to 15 accommodate, you know, the -- the demands that are being 16 made -- being made by -- by the people themselves. 17 Q: Mr. Commissioner, I'm not sure if 18 this particular document is or is not an exhibit at this 19 point. We're just checking on that -- on that now. 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 Q: And just lastly, with respect to this 24 particular agreement, Mr. Mercredi, do you know whether 25 or not all of the terms of this agreement have in fact

1 been implemented? 2 A: No. I -- I have not been in the 3 office of National Chiefs since 1997. So I wouldn't 4 know, you know, what the outcome of this agreement would 5 be. But I can tell you that it's impact, I can talk 6 about it's impact at the time though, which I think is 7 very important, and which highlights the essence of my 8 argument why political leaders have to be involved in 9 finding resolution. 10 Because when this -- when this -- when the 11 federal government indicated the desire to -- to be 12 helpful in this matter, it was -- it was extremely useful 13 in terms of making people feel more -- more confident 14 about -- about the future of their community. And that 15 here was a government coming forward with a -- with a 16 commitment to try to resolve that land question that they 17 were facing. 18 And this was extremely important news and 19 it certainly cleared the path, you know, to go beyond the 20 conflict. This -- so that the focus changed to -- to the 21 land question, that the attention was no longer the 22 conflict itself, that this agreement was -- was a way of 23 -- it was like a path forward, so people could redirect 24 their attention on the steps forward and not dwell too 25 much on -- on the incident at hand.

1 So I -- I remember Ron Irwin coming with 2 Elijah Harper -- and, I mean, I'm sure Elijah must have 3 had a -- a nice hand in this thing too. And -- and I -- 4 I remember the, you know, how -- how relieved I felt 5 myself, and I'm not even from the community. But you can 6 imagine how -- how the leadership must have felt and -- 7 and the relaxation of the atmosphere. 8 This is important that if there -- when 9 there's tension in the air and a government does 10 something positive like this, it -- it clearly relaxes 11 the atmosphere and people can then redirect their 12 attention on -- on the issue itself and -- and engage 13 themselves in -- in this process with the Federal 14 Government. 15 And in the meantime, if -- if there is a 16 reluctant party as was the case involving the Province of 17 Ontario, then at least you have a process with one (1) of 18 the governments and then you proceed with that and 19 hopefully the other side will -- will engage in something 20 constructive further down the road, right. But you're -- 21 you're not trapped by them anymore, you're not controlled 22 by them anymore because you have now a process with -- 23 with another government. 24 Q: All right. For the record, Mr. 25 Commissioner, the document that I had referred to earlier

1 is marked as Exhibit P-46. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 3 4 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME: 5 Q: Did you have any further involvement, 6 Mr. Mercredi beyond this in -- in this matter that -- 7 that you can recall for us today and tell us about? 8 A: Part of the role of the National 9 Chief is -- is to -- is to get involved in issues like 10 this, but ongoing responsibility -- ongoing 11 responsibility would -- would rest with the Regional 12 Vice-Chief, which -- which would have been Gord Peters. 13 So, any further involvement between the Province would -- 14 would have engaged his office, the Chiefs of Ontario 15 office. 16 I, myself, in terms of any further ongoing 17 activities on this -- on -- on this case, they -- they -- 18 they would have been sporadic, if any. In fact, my 19 involvement was no longer with the official part of the - 20 - of the issue at hand, like, in other words, dealing 21 with the governments. 22 My involvement was now working with Sam 23 and his family, primarily with Sam in dealing with the 24 issues that they faced and helping -- trying -- trying to 25 be helpful in terms of giving them an opportunity to

1 attend a national meeting of the Chiefs for his family to 2 -- to relate to the Chiefs what had happened and how they 3 lost their -- their -- their relative, their brother, 4 Dudley George. 5 And then at the same time to seek 6 financial assistance to try to raise money for the court 7 case, because they were getting involved in a civil -- 8 civil matter. 9 And these are poor people with no funding. 10 So obviously, you know, it's tough for them to -- to -- 11 to launch a civil suit against the government that is 12 well resourced. 13 So we try to be helpful in -- in that 14 regard and whenever -- whenever Sam called me to -- to 15 try to be of assistance to him I -- I always responded in 16 a positive way and -- but other than that, I would not 17 have been engaged in any official discussions with the 18 government. 19 I would not have been involved in 20 negotiating any of these provisions of the Memorandum of 21 Agreement, that would have been deferred to the -- to -- 22 to -- to the parties involved in that land question; that 23 means the people of Stoney and -- and Chief Bressette and 24 Sam's family and the Chiefs of Ontario Office would have 25 been involved as a facilitator.

1 Q: And I take it, Mr. Mercredi, that in 2 your capacity as National Chief following this event, 3 given your involvement in it, given the experience -- 4 your own personal experience that you have been good 5 enough to share with us yesterday morning -- pardon me, 6 yesterday afternoon, and together with the considerable 7 experience that you had acquired in the course of dealing 8 with other crisis situations, is there anything that you 9 can tell us here about the response and the impact of 10 these events from the -- from the Ipperwash incident on 11 First Nations across the country and, indeed, on 12 Canadians generally, from your -- again, from your 13 perspective as the -- as the National Chief? 14 A: Well, public opinion is -- is shaped 15 by -- by the media to -- to a large extent in this 16 country and the media have a very powerful influence in 17 terms of what knowledge is given to the public. 18 And our people have not been that 19 effective in getting our message to the Canadian people. 20 Our voice is sometimes filtered by the reporters or by 21 the media itself. And our -- our statements could also 22 be misinterpreted or reinterpreted by -- by the editorial 23 board of these papers in terms of their own perspective, 24 right. 25 And that's why when I was the National

50
  1  Chief, as much as I was able to do this, I tried to have
  2  live interviews on television or in radio.  Because
  3  through live interviews no one can misrepresent what you
  4  said.  What you said is what you said, right.  And what
  5  people heard is what you said.  
  6                 So it's very important I think for -- for
  7  the people who are communicating what they call the news
  8  to be informed about our people; to be extremely informed
  9  about who we are as a people, what our goals are and --
 10  and -- not to -- not to report on -- on their own
 11  perspective but to actually express what we're saying,
 12  right.
 13                 And that -- that is not an easy task, I
 14  gather, because obviously this is something maybe the
 15  school of journalism needs to look at besides -- besides
 16  the reporters themselves.  But I think we need to work
 17  more on public education.  
 18                 Myself, I think we need to have a new -- a
 19  new dialogue with the -- with the public, not just for
 20  the government, and that our leaders have to begin paying
 21  more attention to -- to their neighbours, like spending
 22  more time informing the public and -- and civil leaders,
 23  like civic leaders, senior people in -- in governments,
 24  senior people in police associations and -- and become
 25  more -- good neighbours, so to speak.

51
  1                 Like people have to meet more regularly
  2  and develop an understanding and try to come up with a
  3  better approach to conflict when conflict arises.  And
  4  conflicts do inform the public, as well, that something
  5  is not well and something is not right in this country.
  6                 So conflict is, and sometimes the only
  7  time that we can get to inform the public about our
  8  issues, which is unfortunate because in -- in -- in
  9  between conflict there's hardly any news, right.  
 10                 But there is still a lot of activity in
 11  our communities and our people still face a lot of issues
 12  and problems; some internal, some dealing with
 13  governments.  And that there are some very positive
 14  developments in all our communities where people are
 15  trying to elevate their -- their social economic
 16  conditions and address their long standing disputes with
 17  the governments.
 18                 And those are stories that need to be
 19  conveyed to the public so that they don't see us only as
 20  irritants or agitators, you know.  Because sometimes the
 21  only time they -- they get a chance to get to know us is
 22  when they read about us involving a conflict like
 23  Ipperwash or Gustafson or Burnt Church, right.
 24                 You -- you don't get to know people
 25  through conflict, that's the last place to look to

1 understand people. You don't understand the police 2 through conflict, and you obviously don't understand 3 Aboriginal people through conflict. 4 Like, conflict is not a good place for 5 understanding, is the point I make, right. So the best 6 time to understand each other as good neighbours, I 7 think, is when there is no conflict. And that's when 8 there should be concerted dialogue and -- and our leaders 9 have to take that lead role. 10 I think we can't put the onus on the other 11 side all the time, right; that we have to take some 12 responsibility to inform and advise people in authority 13 what our goals and desires and aspirations are. 14 If, for example, many times I will 15 encounter an average -- what they call the average 16 Canadian. I don't know why he's so average, maybe his 17 income is, I don't know, but they call him the average 18 Canadian. And I might see him at the airport or 19 somewhere and -- and they'd say, Chief Mercredi, why do 20 you people want self-government. 21 And, I mean, that's an important question 22 and it takes a lot of time to explain, like, you can't do 23 it in a few minutes, right, because it has historical 24 context to it. 25 Like, for one (1) thing, they have to

1 understand that the reason we want our own self- 2 government is because for the past century we have been 3 governed under the Indian Act by the Federal Government, 4 and they haven't done a very good about it. But how do 5 you, you know, engage them in that? 6 And so, obviously, the point I'm making is 7 that these issues of -- of government are important to 8 our people. And -- and because they're important to our 9 people, they're important to the rest of the country, 10 right. And our neighbours have to see us in a different 11 context, not as troublemakers but people who are trying 12 to build a better life for themselves and they want to 13 use self-government as a -- as a vehicle towards that 14 end. 15 And that if they -- I think if they 16 understood more clearly the issue of the Indian Act, a 17 lot -- a lot of the general public -- and, in fact, if I 18 may say, this -- this could be -- like, a -- a course -- 19 a course offered to social workers and police officers 20 and so on. 21 Because if they understood the historical 22 impact of the Indian Act, they would then understand some 23 of our sentiments as a people, they would better 24 understand our perspective, and they would then -- they 25 wouldn't be so critical about our strong arguments on it.

1 They would understand why we are so 2 forceful about these issues, because if they experienced 3 the same thing, like any people who have experienced 4 trauma or -- or difficulties in their past, as the Jewish 5 people did, will make sure that that experience doesn't 6 re-occur, that it never re-occurs, right. 7 And -- and they will take the steps to 8 make sure that people are aware about their feelings 9 about those incidents, and that the public becomes more 10 informed through -- through the education of -- of those 11 moments in their history. 12 So that is, by way of example, saying to 13 you that we have to do the same. Like, people need to 14 know how the Indian Act was imposed on our people as a 15 way of dispelling our -- our self-determination as a 16 people. 17 The Indian Act was -- was a vehicle for 18 destroying our self-governments, our traditional forms of 19 government. The Indian Act was to displace the 20 confederacy of the Iroquois people, the -- the longhouses 21 in -- involved in the First Nations people in -- in 22 British Columbia, the coastal First Nations, the 23 traditional hereditary governments of the Crees and the 24 Ojibways. 25 I mean, the -- the whole purpose of the

1 Indian Act was to -- to superimpose upon the self ruling 2 people another structure of government that, in time, 3 would displace the traditional forms of self-government 4 that our people had, prior to the imposition of the 5 Indian Act. 6 And I think, you know, the -- the 7 treaties that we have with the Crown, these inform 8 Canadians the nature of our relationship with the 9 country. And, you know, the treaties are not just about 10 hunting rights or fishing rights. This is about 11 relationships. 12 It -- it's about what -- what some people 13 refer to as a covenant chain. It's all about, you know, 14 nation to nation, government to government. And that 15 this perception is still very much part of our psyche as 16 Aboriginal people. It's not something that is going to 17 go away, right, any more than Quebec's sovereignty is 18 going to disappear. 19 Like, it's in that context people have to 20 look at to try to reach an understanding about what 21 shapes us as a people, what's the grounding that we have 22 and why sometimes we say things we -- that we do. Like, 23 why -- why is it that we don't want to be seen as equal? 24 Well, we want to be seen as equal, but 25 there's two (2) concepts of equality, right? One (1) is

1 individual equality. We want individual equality. We 2 don't want to be discriminated against in terms of public 3 services and we certainly don't want to be, you know, 4 second-class citizens within the political legal system 5 of Canada. 6 But there is a -- there is a second 7 equality and it's the equality of collectivities, the -- 8 the equality of nations. Like, self-determination is a - 9 - is a -- is a collective right. Canadians have used 10 that to create their parliaments and their legislatures 11 and so on, but our people also have that right that has 12 been, to some extent, contained by the Indian Act. 13 But -- but our aspirations are to -- are 14 to overcome the Indian Act and to give full expression to 15 that collective right of self-determination, see? So, in 16 that sense, when -- when people say to us we are 17 Canadians, well, what does that mean when -- when an 18 official of the Crown says that to you, or a police 19 officer says that to you, what does it mean? 20 It generally means, join us, assimilate 21 fully, that's what it generally means because it doesn't 22 mean equality in the sense of the collective rights of 23 our people, right? 24 And I think this discourse between us and 25 Canadians needs to -- needs to start again. And, like,

1 for example, in my community right now -- may I speak 2 about my community right now -- about drug issues in my 3 community? 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I don't 5 think anybody would stop you right now. 6 THE WITNESS: Okay. Thank you. Well, 7 that's the first time. 8 Anyway, I was going to say, we have -- we 9 have -- in our community, we have issues with young 10 people and drugs. Our community sees this as a -- as a 11 community problem, right? But it's a problem that can't 12 be resolved without the assistance of the police; we have 13 the RCMP in our community. 14 So, there has to be this relationship 15 established between our leadership and the RCMP officers, 16 right. It's critical for -- for maintaining not just 17 peaceful relations between us, but maintaining 18 what people call law and order in our communities. Our 19 people want law and order in our communities. Without 20 the police, they're not going to be able to achieve that. 21 22 So, they -- they have to work together 23 with the -- with the police in my community dealing with 24 the drug issue, right, that's the only way in which the - 25 - the issue will be dealt with in, you know, to a

1 satisfactory conclusion. 2 And that's what I mean that when people -- 3 all -- all the young officers in Grand Rapids are total 4 strangers to me, like, I've never met them. And insofar 5 as they are concerned maybe Aboriginal people are -- are 6 sort of strangers to them as well, but they will learn 7 who we are. Like, they won't learn if we don't engage 8 them, right? 9 They're not going to learn about us if -- 10 if we dismiss them. Like, the only ways they're -- 11 they're going to really learn about us is if we work with 12 them. But -- but the converse is true, like they can't 13 isolate themselves from our community either, they have 14 to engage our community as well; they have to be part of 15 the community, right? 16 And it's that relationship that we have to 17 build. And that's why I've always supported, when I was 18 the National Chief, the -- the Aboriginal -- the National 19 Aboriginal Police Associations -- the Association. I 20 know that, in the end, policing has to be done by our 21 people -- by our people, right? 22 And this is essential for doing policing 23 our way, which is somewhat different sometimes than the 24 general society. 25 Like -- like because of our grounding that

1 the culture gives us, our perspective about justice is 2 somewhat different. We're not so much into law and 3 order, you know, like punitive law and order. We're into 4 more like peace -- peaceful law and order, like, 5 peacekeepers; that approach. 6 Restorative -- what -- what the academics 7 call restorative justice. What we call being sensitive 8 to humans, right; that same idea. Like, I think we have 9 been trapped by the Indian Act for so long that we have 10 in effect suppressed ourselves. 11 Like we say the white people have 12 suppressed us. But in reality we have suppressed 13 ourselves because we have allowed the Indian Act into our 14 lives. 15 I don't know what relevance this has to 16 you, Your Honour, but it may have some in terms of at 17 least appreciating that there is such a thing as the 18 Aboriginal perspective in Canada and it's an outstanding, 19 you know, outstanding in more than one (1) way. It's an 20 outstanding perspective that needs to still find its 21 place in the country. 22 Q: I appreciate those comments, Mr. 23 Mercredi. 24 I think, Mr. Commissioner, that those are 25 all the questions that I have in examination-in-chief and

1 perhaps this might be a good time to -- 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It will be 3 but just before we do it I would like to get a sense of-- 4 MR. DONALD WORME: I was going to ask 5 that as well. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- how many 7 -- how many of the parties may wish to ask Chief Mercredi 8 some questions. As you appreciate, Chief Mercredi, each 9 of the parties have an opportunity, if they choose, to 10 ask questions. 11 Who expects to question Chief Mercredi? 12 Let's see -- let's get a rough idea of how long do you 13 expect. 14 Yes, Mr. Orkin...? 15 MR. ANDREW ORKIN: Half to three-quarters 16 (3/4) of an hour. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And Mr. 18 Rosenthal...? 19 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Fifteen (15) to 20 twenty (20) minutes. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And Mr. 22 Horton...? 23 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: About fifteen (15) 24 minutes, sir. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And --

1 MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: Good morning, 2 Commissioner. My name is Colleen Johnson. I will be 3 replacing William Henderson, and possibly ten (10) 4 minutes. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 6 very much. 7 Mr. Falconer...? 8 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Fifteen (15) to 9 twenty (20) minutes, Mr. Commissioner. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 11 very much. 12 Ms. Tuck-Jackson...? 13 MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: About twenty 14 (20) minutes, sir. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Ms. 16 Jones...? 17 MS. KAREN JONES: About ten (10) minutes. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 19 Downard...? 20 MR. PETER DOWNARD: Reserve fifteen (15) 21 minutes. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And -- 23 MS. DANA COHEN-NEHEMIA: Just one (1) or 24 two (2) minutes. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you

1 very much. So you can get an idea of what you're -- what 2 you're facing, Chief Mercredi. We'll take a break now 3 and come back. We should be able to complete it this 4 afternoon. 5 Thank you very much. 6 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 7 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 8 for fifteen minutes. 9 10 --- Upon recessing at 10:29 a.m. 11 --- Upon resuming at 10:57 a.m. 12 13 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 14 resumed. Please be seated. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. Orkin, I 16 understand that Chief Mercredi is your client. 17 MR. ANDREW ORKIN: That's correct. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And you have 19 some supplementary matters that you wish to bring out 20 before cross-examination begins. And in that way -- we 21 did this, I think, once before with Mr. Rosenthal. 22 MR. ANDREW ORKIN: That's correct. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And it's -- 24 MR. ANDREW ORKIN: There's a precedent. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- and I

1 guess it was Mr. Roland's idea, and it seems to have 2 worked, rather than wait and then other counsel may not 3 have an opportunity to cross-examine on matters that you 4 bring out. 5 So I would ask you to do that now but I 6 would ask you not to go over and bring out matters that 7 have already been dealt with, if that's possible, just to 8 bring out any new or additional matters that have not 9 been dealt with in this supplementary part. 10 And then you, of course, have your right 11 to ask questions, as other counsel do, at the end. 12 MR. ANDREW ORKIN: That's correct, Mr. 13 Commissioner. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Is that all 15 right? 16 MR. ANDREW ORKIN: If -- if I could 17 characterize what we're doing is perhaps adding a level 18 of specificity to areas that have not been addressed in 19 that specificity but will -- I'll take your caution. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Let's take 21 it and see where we get to. 22 MR. ANDREW ORKIN: Yes. Thank you. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 24 Mr. Orkin. 25

1 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. ANDREW ORKIN: 2 Q: Mr. Mercredi, as you know, I'm Andrew 3 Orkin. I'm co-counsel to the Dudley George Estate and 4 the Sam George Family Group. 5 We've heard evidence that the Chippewas of 6 this area entered into a treaty in 1828 in which 7 accommodations were made between the Chippewas and the 8 Crown with respect to approximately 2 million acres of 9 land, of traditional lands, and in -- in which certain 10 portions of those traditional lands were reserved for 11 them, including the lands that later became Ipperwash 12 Provincial Park, for their exclusive occupation and use 13 forever. 14 You mentioned yesterday that you were 15 legal counsel for the Chiefs of Manitoba during the 16 period of the early 1980's, when the Constitution of 17 Canada was amended, to include a separate part 18 recognizing and affirming distinct constitutional 19 protection for treaty rights; is -- is that correct? 20 A: That's correct, yes. 21 Q: Is it fair to say that this was a -- 22 a fundamental change in the constitutional make-up of 23 Canada? 24 A: Well, prior to -- prior to 25 repatriation, the nature and the scope of our -- of our

1 rights were defined by the courts within the context of 2 the -- the existing federal-provincial jurisdictions and 3 authority. 4 Since Section 35, that perspective has 5 altered because now the courts are looking at our rights 6 not from the perspective of how they fit into the 7 existing political system or legal system, but they look 8 at the source of the right and the nature and the scope 9 of that right in contemporary times. 10 So in that sense it has provided our 11 people with more opportunity to advance their rights in 12 the courts. 13 Q: And the -- the affirmation and 14 constitutional protection of treaty rights is -- is 15 essential component of that -- of that change? 16 A: Well, we tried, during the 17 Charlottetown Accord, to reform the country in a very 18 fundamental way. One was to have the Constitution 19 amended to recognize our self-government as one (1) of 20 the three (3) orders of government in the country, not as 21 a third level but as a distinct order of government 22 within the country. 23 And -- but the other important provision 24 had to do with historical grievances about the -- the 25 non-respect of treaties on the part of the Crown.

1 Just to give you an idea, Your Honour, in 2 -- in my province we had outstanding treaty entitlement. 3 A century after the treaty was made, we still didn't get 4 all our land designated as reserves. It wasn't even set 5 aside for us. It -- it was just forgotten, I guess. 6 So it was important for us to have a 7 constitutional provision that contained an instruction, I 8 guess, to the politicians and to the courts on how to 9 interpret treaty rights. 10 And so part of the Charlottetown was to 11 try to amend the -- the supreme law in that way by adding 12 a provision that would require the courts and -- and the 13 governments to respect the treaties in a manner more 14 clearly -- as understood by the -- by the First Nation 15 signatories of those treaties. 16 Q: And you're saying that this -- this 17 effort in the 1980's in which you were constitutional 18 counsel to -- to amend the Constitution of Canada to 19 include treaty rights and -- and -- and enshrine and 20 protect them was -- was the result of a massive effort 21 across the country by First Nations peoples and their 22 leaders in which they engaged because they believed that 23 these treaties, some of which were -- were, as you put 24 it, more than a hundred years old, were still relevant 25 and important today?

1 A: The treaties are -- are relevant in 2 people's lives, not because of the -- the reservations 3 emerged from there, but because their right -- rights to 4 a livelihood stem from there. 5 For example, in most communities across 6 the country, there is the hunting right to -- to fish -- 7 I mean the right to fish and the hunting rights and the 8 right to trap as per treaty -- as per the treaties that 9 were signed by the Crown. 10 Our people exercise those livelihood 11 matters on a daily basis, so that the treaty is 12 understood by them -- it's a living document for them. 13 Q: In addition to the specific treaty of 14 1928 that I mentioned between the -- I'm sorry, 1828 -- 15 that I mentioned, an expert witness testified in -- in 16 this Inquiry context regarding something she called the 17 "Covenant Chain," which you've referred to as well 18 between the Crown and the Chippewas. 19 As an Aboriginal leader and citizen and 20 lawyer, is there anything you could tell the Commissioner 21 that would assist him in -- in further understanding this 22 concept, the Covenant Chain concept? 23 A: I think in terms of our efforts for 24 recognition as a people, as -- as a distinct people in 25 Canada, this -- this part -- this part of our history is

1 the least understood by Canadians and -- and by 2 governments. 3 See, the tendency -- the tendency within 4 Canada is -- is to assume that Canada cannot be 5 perfected, that -- that it is completely sovereign and -- 6 on all matters, we're all citizens including Aboriginal 7 people. 8 But we come with a different perspective 9 and that is, we never surrendered our self-determination 10 as a people and that the -- the Covenant Chain is about 11 that, our -- our freedom as a people. 12 But also, it's about our relationship to - 13 - to the land. It's about our territories as a people, 14 I'm sure you've heard witnesses talking about territory 15 in your time as the Commissioner. 16 They are referring to a belief that we 17 have based on our -- our history and our -- our oral 18 understanding of that history that we have a right to our 19 own space as a people, that -- that is not suppressed by 20 the larger society. Like -- like, it's a belief that 21 says we don't have to fit in to your legal and political 22 system, we can co-exist, see? 23 The idea of the Covenant Chain is that, 24 the co-existence of separate peoples, but it doesn't mean 25 separate, unequal, as the blacks were treated, you know,

1 in the southern States. It's -- it's none of those 2 things. It's not apartheid. 3 It -- it is about two (2) distinct nations 4 coming to an understanding about how they're going to co- 5 exist and throughout our history in our -- in our 6 relations with Canada, you -- you know, there -- there 7 would have historical moments to try to arrive at that 8 understanding and the Covenant Chain, as reflected by the 9 Two Row Wampums and other instruments like that would be 10 one (1) way of providing evidence through that Covenant 11 Chain. 12 The number -- the pre-confederation 13 treaties were also a symbol of that, a recognition of the 14 distinct people concept of -- but still trying to co- 15 exist without arriving at a position of being the same. 16 And more recently I shouldn't say 17 recently, but pre-confed -- post-confederation, like 18 after 1867, all the numbered treaties are about the 19 covenant chain. 20 I don't want to take up too much of your 21 time, Your Honour, but these -- these matters are 22 considered by some Elders across the country as sacred 23 instruments of relationships with Canada. 24 And if I may, just very quickly, tell you 25 a story that -- to highlight the importance of these to

1 our communities. 2 I attended a -- the commemoration of 3 Treaty 6 in Frog Lake. I believe it was in the mid 4 '90's. I forget the exact year, but they have the 5 original stem of the pipe that was used to -- to 6 commemorate -- I mean to conclude the Treaty in their 7 way. 8 The official conclusion of the Treaty was 9 signatures, which they also provided. But the Aboriginal 10 people, the First Nations people also had their way of 11 giving a stamp of approval, you know, to the Treaty which 12 was the pipe ceremony. 13 And they lost the stone of the pipe but 14 they retained -- they were able to keep the stem of the 15 pipe which they would bring out every so many years to 16 commemorate the Treaty. And -- and that event would 17 bring in all the -- all their people together. 18 And the important part about this story is 19 this. When the -- when they unravelled it and they pray 20 to the Creator, they sought the intervention the Creator 21 in getting what they referred to as their Little Brother, 22 meaning the -- the white society to come to terms with -- 23 with their obligations into the Treaty so that to appeal 24 to the Creator for the -- for white society to honour the 25 Treaty.

71
  1                 So I think like in terms of covenant chain
  2  we -- we -- it is one of those what I refer to
  3  outstanding questions between us and Canada.  Like the --
  4  the journey has not concluded yet.  We tried through the
  5  Charlottetown Accord to give this new vision of the
  6  country that would be based on those concepts.  But we
  7  did not succeed because the referendum was not
  8  successful.  
  9                 But it doesn't mean that the goal is dead. 
 10  The goal is very much alive, I think, to restore that
 11  understanding of -- of relationships between us and the
 12  rest of the country.
 13                 Q:   To get specific about some of the --
 14  and to return to the -- to the Ipperwash context arising
 15  out of these rights and the covenant chains, this Inquiry
 16  has heard testimony that Dudley stated spiritedly on one
 17  (1) or more occasions, This is our land, with reference
 18  to the reserve treaty lands at Stoney Point.
 19                 In light of the fact that Mr. George is
 20  unfortunately and obviously not here to tell us himself,
 21  is there anything that -- that you could tell the
 22  Commissioner that might assist him in -- in understanding
 23  the significance of an Aboriginal demonstrator who was
 24  trying after decades of -- of governmental inaction to
 25  bring about the return of his people's lands and saying,

1 this is our land? 2 A: That's not unusual. I mean it's 3 commonplace for people to say this is our land, because 4 this is our land. Like, for example when it comes to 5 Treaty Number 5 which is the treaty that my ancestors 6 signed, under that Treaty we have rights that can be 7 exercised only if we have access to the land.s 8 Like, you can't hunt on the reservation. 9 The reservations are very small and tiny pieces of land. 10 So the right -- the Treaty rights can only begin full 11 expression in the entire territory of our Treaty. 12 So that's why when I was growing up I -- I 13 know from my Elders -- the Elders who -- who I grew up 14 with would say, in my presence, (NATIVE LANGUAGE SPOKEN), 15 This is our land. (NATIVE LANGUAGE SPOKEN). This is 16 still all our land, see. 17 And they would wave like this and they 18 didn't mean just the reservation, they didn't mean just 19 the reservation, so it is not uncommon for our people to 20 assert this is our land, right? 21 And, in fact, if you look at the -- the 22 official Canadian song, it does say, "Our home and native 23 land." That's pretty good -- that's pretty good 24 authority to say this is our -- 25 Q: Thank you. We've heard evidence, Mr.

1 Mercredi, that Premier Harris stated in the immediate 2 aftermath of the shooting of Dudley George that the 3 Stoney Point occupiers were illegal. 4 Based on your experience again, as an 5 Aboriginal citizen and leader, is there anything you can 6 tell the Commissioner that would assist him in 7 understanding the, or further understanding the political 8 meanings to First Nations people of -- of a statement 9 such as this? 10 A: Yeah, well, again, that would not be 11 unusual to hear that from an official of government or a 12 politician from the Crown. He would not have been the 13 first or the last to say it, right? This would have been 14 based on -- on -- on their own official records, whatever 15 official records they have and it would be based on their 16 own understanding of their country. 17 If -- if I learned anything as the 18 National Chief and that is, when I dealt with these 19 Premiers and -- and the Prime Ministers, they had an 20 abiding -- I would say -- an abiding faith in -- in -- in 21 their -- in their role as leaders of their country. I 22 saw that in -- in negotiations at Charlottetown so I -- I 23 learned to appreciate their perspective, but that is 24 their perspective, right? 25 And then their -- their resource of the

1 Aboriginal perspective, which is when we assert rights to 2 territories or to -- or to resources, we don't think 3 we're being illegal. We don't see ourselves as 4 criminals, we see ourselves as champions for our people, 5 champions for our rights. I'm -- I'm pretty sure that's 6 how Dudley George would have perceived himself, like, 7 that he's fighting for the return of their land. 8 And I mean, when -- when you are faced 9 with injustice, like the wrongful taking of your land, 10 the passing of the years does not make the wrongful 11 taking less easy for you to accept, nor does it make it 12 right. The passage of time does not give stolen land a 13 different character, it's still stolen land, right? 14 So, like, for example, we have a treaty to 15 -- to hunt migratory birds. In 1929, without our 16 consent, without -- without our participation, the 17 Federal Government signed a treaty with the Americans -- 18 an international treaty -- for the protection of 19 migratory birds, which was subsequently made into a law, 20 The Migratory Birds Convention Act. 21 And when they started imposing that law, 22 you know, in -- in Cree territory in Manitoba, our people 23 said, No, this is not what we agreed to. You -- you 24 know, we agreed that we could hunt migratory birds. 25 There's no season here, it's -- it's a right to hunt

1 migratory birds. 2 But -- but as far as the province and the 3 Federal Government were concerned they had imposed these 4 criteria for the exercise of their right, so in effect, 5 they were rewriting the treaty after the fact. And our 6 people didn't -- didn't go along with that, so they 7 continued hunting, even though, you know, they would -- 8 they would be prevented from doing it. 9 They would persist in doing it because 10 that's the essence of the treaty. They weren't prepared 11 to abandon the -- the -- you know, the essence of the 12 treaty. 13 Q: The evidence led at this Inquiry has 14 shown that a large number of riot police and tactical 15 units or unit were deployed at Ipperwash in response to a 16 few dozen First Nations people who had occupied the 17 Provincial Park that wasn't really in use at the time. 18 Again, based on your experience as a -- as 19 a First Nations leader and citizen, in your view, could 20 you assist us in understanding the significance of the 21 use of force by Canadian governments when First Nations 22 demonstrators occupied treaty lands that were taken from 23 them but which they still believe is their land? 24 A: Well, you -- you grow up with certain 25 understandings, right, you -- you've got certain ideals.

1 And since you're asking my -- my response as -- as one 2 (1) person, I always thought that it would be possible to 3 reform the country in -- in a way in which it would be -- 4 it would be made easier for our people to -- to coexist 5 within that country. 6 But I never thought that I would see the 7 use of force as a way of exacting political will on the 8 of Canada, as they did in Oka. The incident in Oka left 9 a permanent imprint in the psychology of our people that 10 the State, namely Canada, will be quite prepared to use 11 force to -- to exact compliance in terms of their 12 positions on -- on matters that we don't agree on, right? 13 So that is not a very positive or -- 14 message to convey to any Aboriginal children in the 15 country, much less, you know, the Elders or -- or to the 16 leaders. But, nonetheless, that's the message. It's 17 there. 18 So my concern when I saw what happened in 19 Gustafson with the presence of the RCMP there, was unless 20 -- unless steps were taken to say to Canada, This is 21 wrong, you can't deal with us in this manner, that it 22 might become a precedent, that other governments might do 23 that. 24 And so when the Ontario government did the 25 same thing, then my paranoia, like, we all get our

1 moments, made me wonder if this is in fact the strategy 2 on the part of governments as a way of -- of giving a 3 signal to the Indian people that, You better behave 4 yourself, or, You better conduct yourselves in a certain 5 way. 6 I mean, you can't help but come to that, 7 you know, wondering because that's not part of the ideal 8 that you have to begin with. And you know that these 9 issues are real, that they're not made up by our people, 10 they're not false, and we don't do it to be 11 controversial. And when we assert our statements with 12 respect to our positions, we're not trying to be 13 militant, we're trying to be assertive about our 14 position. 15 So the -- the use of -- the use of force 16 is totally inappropriate in dealing with political 17 matters between us and Canada. 18 Q: Mr. Mercredi, could you tell us 19 perhaps which individuals or leaders have had the 20 greatest influence on you in developing your approach to 21 -- to First Nations leadership and advocacy in -- of the 22 course of your lifetime? 23 A: I would say my parents would be one 24 (1) in terms of the values that they believe in, and that 25 is to treat all people with respect; and they didn't say

1 just Cree people, they said all people with respect. 2 And I recall one (1) time during the 3 Charlottetown Accord I might have got a little carried 4 away, which can happen, and I may have said some angry 5 words. She called me that day, I'll tell you, she called 6 me that day to tell me, you know, that's not the way to 7 deal with the issue. 8 So I -- I would say the parents had great 9 influence and in the -- but I'm also a student of 10 history. Like a self taught -- I won't say academic, but 11 a self taught student. 12 And I studied political movements before I 13 became a political leader. I -- I studied about the 14 black liberation movements in Africa on my own not -- not 15 at university and -- and I read about some leaders like 16 Mahatma Ghandi. And that's where the concept of de- 17 colonization was best understood by reading his 18 autobiography, but also all these other prints about him. 19 And I -- I admired his perspective 20 immensely about how you crea -- how you cause justice 21 from injustice, right; that -- that the way in which to 22 proceed is not an eye for an eye or tooth for a tooth; it 23 wasn't that approach. 24 But you still have to stand up though. 25 Like, you don't lie over and let people walk over you.

1 You still assert your right and but you do it in a 2 principled way, that you -- you don't become the 3 aggressor. Even -- even if it means that you -- you may 4 be injured, to accept that injury. 5 That to me is a -- is a philosophy of -- 6 of great courage, right. And when you look at a -- when 7 you try to translate that into our situation, it made 8 immense sense to me that if -- if we're going to make any 9 progress in terms of our political struggle with Canada, 10 we can't do it -- do it with violence. 11 That the only way we're going to succeed 12 is to follow the example of -- of Martin Luther King with 13 respect to black rights in the United States. And 14 Mahatma Ghandi with respect to the liberation of India 15 from Great Britain. 16 So I -- I try to apply some of those 17 concepts in my own political thought, you know. And as a 18 leader I -- I try to convey that in terms of my dealings 19 with my own community and my own people and especially 20 with a larger society. 21 It made immense sense to me that when you 22 have a -- a people like the Aboriginal people who -- who 23 are less than 3 percent of the population, that this 24 would be the best course of action for them. The most -- 25 the most practical approach to -- to justice would be

1 through non-violence. 2 MR. ANDREW ORKIN: Thank you, Mr. 3 Mercredi. 4 Thank you, Mr. Commissioner and under 5 reserve of an opportunity at the end if that's 6 appropriate, I thank you for this. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 8 Mr. Orkin. 9 Mr. Rosenthal...? 10 11 (BRIEF PAUSE) 12 13 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Thank you. Good 14 morning, Mr. Commissioner. 15 16 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL. 17 Q: Good morning, Mr. Mercredi. 18 A: Good morning. 19 Q: My name is Peter Rosenthal. I'm one 20 (1) of the Counsel for a group of Stoney Pointers who are 21 -- under the name Aazhoodena and George Family Group at 22 this Inquiry. 23 A: Okay. 24 Q: I just have a couple of areas to 25 follow up on. You -- you told us yesterday that it made

1 no sense that the police would advance on the Park at 2 night. And you -- you said it made no sense then and it 3 doesn't make any sense even now in retrospect. 4 When Superintendent Coles phoned you at 5 four o'clock in the morning on September 7 or five 6 o'clock whichever it was, what explanation did he give 7 you for having advanced on the Park five (5) hours 8 earlier? 9 A: I don't -- I don't remember if there 10 was an explanation given. He was reporting on what 11 happened and -- but he didn't provide any explanations 12 that I remember anyway. 13 Q: Then -- and then when you met the 14 next day with OPP officers and so on, there must have 15 been discussion as to what they thought they were doing 16 at eleven o'clock at night, advancing on the Park? 17 A: Well, when we had that meeting that I 18 referred to with -- Inspec -- Mr. Coles, I don't know 19 what his official title is. 20 Q: Superintendent Coles? 21 A: Yeah, and some of his people, that 22 issue was discussed. 23 Q: Yes. 24 A: Like, and I -- I don't know if they 25 tried to justify it or not. I mean, how -- how can you